619 and the Marabit.
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The Qit'an tribe, based partly in Libya and partly
* [613] in Egypt, is a tribe in the same sense that the Awlad 'Ali is one, i.e., at the secondary level of the lineage system.
[166] This tribe moved into Egypt sometime around 1900. The
[195] Bedouins of al-Qasr estimate that "50% of the Qit'an are with Ali Ahmar,.30% with Sinaina, and 20% with Ali Abyad."
619 In 1956, certain events occurred in Libya which brought about
695 a declaration of independence from Sa'adi domination by the
• 598 Qit'an in that country. The Qit'an felt that their numbers were sufficiently large enough that they should represent themselves in the Libyan parliament. In other words, the Marabtiin were no longer willing to settle for the traditional social categories and role structures allotted to them. After these events in Libya, some members of the Qit'an came to Egypt and informed their brothers about the formation of the tribe as a separate entity, and convinced the Egyptian Qit'an to do the same--which they did.

The Bedouins say that the Governor of Marsa Matruh encouraged the Qit'an tribe to increase their numbers in the area after he learned of their desire to be free from Sa'adi domination. There had been a small number of Qit'an in the town of Marsa Matruh. This number quickly grew in size and political strength so that it could challenge the power of the 'Ali Ahmar who are considered the dominant tribe in this

619 area of the Western Desert. And, according to the Governor
675 of the province, it is the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr who are the
578 most powerful of the three primary segments of the 'Ali Ahmar; for example, they have succeeded in sending their 'umda (chief) to the National Assembly in Cairo. In fact, it was over the
666 election of the 'umda in 1964 that the split between the Marabit Qit'an and the Sa'adi Ali Ahmar became an open one and produced political rumblings among the tribes. This case makes explicit the relationship between the two types of tribes in the Western Desert, and gives an important instance of the operation of structural principles in defining groups and group relations.

619 During the national elections of 1964, it was the
675 traditional duty of the Marabit to vote for his affiliated
666 Sa'adi candidate. Since the Qit'an are allied in a client-
578 protector relationship with the Ali Ahmar, all of the Marabtiin of this tribe should have given their votes to the 'umda of the 'Aishaibat who was seeking office to the National Assembly. But, instead, the Qit'an ran a candidate of their own--largely at the urging of the Governor, it is said. But, despite this Marabit opposition, the 'Aishaibat were successful in getting their 'umda elected. Furthermore,
619 the 'Aishaibat said that this rebellion of the Marabtiin
675 could not go unpunished, that reprisals would be taken. The
578 type of sanction which the 'Aishaibat directed against the
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619 Qit'an is one which is employed in both the internal and
675 the external systems of political relations: it is an or-
• 598 ganized sanction taken by the corporate representatives
626 against socially disapproved behavior. Against the Marabtiin,
619 it involved a closure of group affiliation and protective
675 alliance usually obtainable through affinal ties. The Qit'an
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* 613 were prohibited from marrying into the 'Aishaibat primary
626 segment. The sanction was tested while I was in the field.
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> In March of 1965, 'Umda Ziyad of the Qit'an contracted a marriage for his son with one of the secondary groups of the 'Aishaibat. He went through all of the marriage preliminaries and paid a brideprice of 70 E.L. (Egyptian pounds). But afterwards, the girl's family, following the advice of the 'Aishaibi corporate heads, returned the brideprice and refused his offer. The 'Umda of the Qit'an then went to talk to the brothers of the girl (for her father was dead) and told them that he would pay a brideprice of 1000 E.L. "but I want the girl." He paid them part of the brideprice (for they had agreed in the face of this unusual offer) and sent a car to pick up the girl. The arrangement did not succeed, for the paternal cousin of the girl who, according to Bedouin custom and tradition, had a prior claim on her, stopped the car at gunpoint. The corporate heads had told the cousin that this was his right, and in this case, his duty. Then the corporate heads of the 'Aishaibat called a council, and the members met with the brothers of the girl. They told the brothers: "You know what happened at the time of the election. 'Umda Ziyad is 'Ali Ahmar and he should have voted for our 'umda, but he tricked us." The brothers refused to be persuaded by the tribal leaders. They said that if anyone from the 'Aishaibat would pay them more than 1000 E.L., they would give their sister to him. The leaders warned the brothers that if they went through with this marriage they would each be fined 200 E.L. Finally, and after this meeting, the leaders went to 'Umda Ziyad himself with the threat, that were he to go through with this marriage "all of the 'Aishaibat will begin to fight you." The 'umda

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could not afford to risk such large scale conflict and so he withdrew his offer of marriage to the brothers. After this, as a display of authority and an attempt to maintain something of the alliance between their group and the Qit'an, the 'Aishaibi leaders made the public announcement that the girl could marry anyone else, but not the son of 'Umda Ziyad.

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The various sets of authority relations operative in the al-Qasr area are obvious from this account, but they will be better defined as the discussion proceeds. Here, I only wanted to make clear that the relationship between Sa'adi and Marabit is one based upon contract and local contiguity, and reinforced by cognation. There is no unilinear basis for the relationship and no attempt to fit it into a "unilinear genealogical mould." The structural differentiation between [582] Sa'adi and Marabit seems to reflect a dominant-subjective relationship, in the sense discussed by Weber (1947) and Southall (1956), but its possible class overtones are played down by the fact that there are normally no objections to intermarrying between groups. The Bedouin of al-Qasr say, [851] "what is the difference, the children from such a marriage will be Sa'adi anyhow?"

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The Sa'adi-Marabit differentiation is relatively unimportant for a study of al-Qasr itself, since the Marabit number is so small--one lineage consisting of five brothers and their families. The contrast between Sa'adi and Marabit, secular and sacred tribes, becomes more important for a

619 the segmentary system is considered by the Bedouins to be a
*613 monolithic unit: "The Awlad 'Ali are one." But, as with all other segmentary lineage systems, in al-Qasr levels of segmentation reflect degrees of corporateness.

*613 Furthermore, the ideology of structural unity dissolves
178 before the empirical evidence of fission and fusion, processes
619 characteristic of the segmentary society in general. These processes are not common in al-Qasr during the present time. But they must have been in the past, because the segments which Murray (1935) names as making up the Ali Ahmar include only one of those which currently comprise the tribe. The
● [578] only admission of fission which I could obtain from my informants was that, at one time, 'Ailit Ma'fas was a tertiary
[124] segment of 'Ailit Lazumi (see Figure 3). I received this information from a number of my key informants so that it can be accepted despite a denial to the contrary by some of my other informants. There is no empirical link below the secondary level to be discovered in the genealogical maps of these two groups; kinship ties have been manipulated to coincide with ideological claims. The fact that these two lineages are now the wealthiest and most powerful in the al-Qasr area may be an indication that economic and political motivations undermined the unity of 'Ailit Lazumi in the
*613 past. We shall have occasion to return to this opposition
178 between the Lazumi and the Ma'fas when we discuss political
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1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

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office in modern Bedouin society. Also, we will return to the processes of fission and fusion when we discuss Bedouin law. I will be able to show through the use of legal documents how one tertiary unit went through a process of fission, fusion and re-fusion with its secondary unit.

The capacity for fusion and fission is a result of a number of structural situations. First of all, it is the exercise of choice on the part of the tertiary segment members who have contracted alliance in the form of collective responsibility with other tertiary segments of the lineage. The choice to break off from the major group may be of two kinds: a severence of political ties with one group in favor of a new group or the natural process of segmentation as a response to ecological conditions. In the latter case, no new political alliances are formed, and it usually involves a married son going off to begin his own camp. It is only an expansion of the major or secondary group. But the former case is one of decimation: the secondary group contracts. In both cases, authority is exercised, either between father and son, or, between heads of corporate groups. In al-Qasr, the capacity for either type of fission is limited by the political environment of the Egyptian nation-state, the highest level of authority which the Bedouin encounters. The classic functioning of the segmentary lineage system is, in the case of al-Qasr, being changed by extra-system factors. The

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*613 178 177 *578 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959) emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing; depending upon the situation they use the concepts of bait, 'ait, 'aiela and qabiila interchangeably. The term bait literally means "house," the term bait al-'Arab may mean "the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent" [594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and [596] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the ex- [621] tended family is referred to as the naja'. A naja', or camp, usually consists of three or four tents. The word bait may 196 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and oc- *613 casionally one might even refer to the secondary group as a bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness. The term 'aiela, literally "family," is the word used most often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The diminutive of this word, i.e. 'ait, usually refers to the sub-tertiary group but it commonly designates the secondary group [619] also. The term qabiila, "tribe," is the only word used for the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are 196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

582 depending upon the needs of the situation.
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But one is able to differentiate between the various
582 meanings of bint 'amm in al-Qasr. First of all, the Bedouins
196 make an initial dichotamy between the bint 'amm daira (daira =
*613 "homeland") and the bint 'amm shaqiiqa (shaqiiqa = "full sister"). The first term refers to any girl within the primary level of segmentation, i.e., the 'Aishaibat, and the latter term refers to the actual father's brother's daughter. Any marriage within the secondary group, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is referred to simply as a bint 'amm marriage--even if it is really a bint ibn 'amm marriage. A man has an actual moral claim upon his bint 'amm shaqiiqa: such a marriage is an agreement between their fathers who are brothers. A man cannot claim his bint 'amm daira but he might assume that if she is not claimed by her father's brother's son (ibn 'amm), his claim will be favored over that of an outsider.

582 The differentiation between these two types of cousin role is made in terms of rights and obligations which define social relations in al-Qasr. Social action is based upon these expectations of behavior. In al-Qasr, a man really does claim his bint 'amm shaqiiqa. If his claim is thwarted, he will attempt to do something about it, and whatever the consequences, his group is committed to back him in this
[182] matter. Parallel-cousin marriage may be an important basis
• [578] for integration, or it may be the cause of bitter conflict.

582 [584] she could marry no man.

582 • 578 Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings between two men they will place claims upon each other's sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The [182] [571] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis for social relationships between groups, regardless of any [586] conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then, that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making [182] and breaking of group ties. Similarly, to regulate and to maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her. 582 578 159 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the following informant's story indicates.

> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

582 her father was asking was too high. Salih was angry,
•578 so angry that he swore to kill any man who tried to
159 take his bint 'amm. He went away to the Nile Valley to earn enough money to pay the high brideprice. In the meantime, the cousin of the brothers came and paid Aziz for the permission to marry the girl. Salih returned, but, of course, he could not kill his own paternal cousin. He became ill and went into a sleep which lasted for three days. Salih had always been known for his powerful voice but when he awoke he had a very weak voice. Salih never spoke to his brother again. He died seven years ago without every marrying.

582 This story has aprocryphal aspects which announce this to be
578 an important issue in Bedouin culture. The subject of parallel-
829 cousin marriage is a complex one surrounded by controversy and
contradiction. The older Bedouins say that the practice is a
[182] source of conflict, but they will usually insist that at least one of their sons marry his bint 'amm to insure the corporate link with the brother. In support of their complaints, they say that bint 'amm marriage is not morally sanctioned: "We do not like it and it is not right. But if we try to stop our sons from taking their cousins they will put a gun on their shoulder and go after her." On the other hand, this is contrasted with the complaints of the elders that their sons no longer respect their marriage habits, that they are marrying anyone these days: "Our sons resent the bint 'amm marriage because it is an agreement between fathers."
582 While I was in the field, three marriages took place; one was with the bint 'amm, and the other two were outside the secondary group but within the primary group, i.e., inter-lineage.

604 538 brother to special place in the social structure states that
[539] "two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus
[539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation may be the basis for a new network of social relations by making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins
[539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know the name of his khal not the name of his father." This statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties, is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

604 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the
• 578 Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal." This, of course, does not mean that the individual should take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political
562 593 554 182 578 value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays

562 593 554 182 •578 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group, nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict. 562 593 554 182 578 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind together two groups which are structurally differentiated by the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-*613 [431] [628] [574] daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the 562 593 554 [726] [584] Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by individuals in both her husband's group and her father's 562 593 554 582 group. The Bedouins say that "after the bint 'amm, a man should marry his bint khal ("mother's brother's daughter") because she is like his bint 'amm." Usually, over a period of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 593 554 *613 182 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complementary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

concepts of what is desirable and undesirable. "Every structural arrangement," Raymond Firth has said, "has its moral attributes of obligation" (1961:212). This is most essential in an uncentralized system, such as that of al-Qasr, where no institutions exist outside of the corporate group for the introduction of new principles of organization and association.

Among the Bedouins, the conceptualization of an authority structure in the role of 'aqila relates to the high value which they place upon a peaceful and orderly world. Children in al-Qasr are taught that one of their serious duties in life is to mediate conflicts, especially, when they are potentially situations which may lead to protracted conflict. And, in a segmentary society where a member's status links him to many different groups in differing degrees of importance, all quarrels are potential group wars. The Bedouin child knows that his elders, and God, want him to follow "the path of the good" (tariiq al-khair). Mainly, this involves helping others to follow "the path of the good" by "bringing them back together" when they are in conflict. When two individuals quarrel and refuse to return to "the path of the good," this brings 'aib ("shame") to each of the persons. When two individuals quarrel, setting off a group conflict, this brings 'ar ("shame") to the respective corporate groups of the individuals (Abou-Zeid 1966). Against individuals who persist in the ways which cause 'aib to himself, or 'ar to his group,

181 certain sanctions of both a secular and sacred nature may be
*578 imposed: expulsion from the group and the curse of God are
509 ultimate coercive interventions in the process of conflict
626 regulation.
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*613 The role of 'aqila presents the corporate group as
181 "one person" in opposition to other similarly defined groups.
182 Thus, Fortes says (1953:25), "the way a lineage system works
571 depends on the kind of legal institutions found in the society,"
and this is a function of its political organization. The Bedouin political organization is characterized by two aspects: the internal political system, and the external political system. Both systems are regulated by the same values and norms. Authority relations within the corporate level are founded on values inculcated in the socialization process, and prescribe political behavior for all who come under the jurisdiction of the respective 'aqila. Authority relations outside the corporate level are conducted through the 'aqila. This political role as a functional part of the lineage structure operates in terms of kinship values; politics at the external level are characterized by no new principles.

*613 Politics in al-Qasr, and elsewhere for that matter, is
571 a process of problem-solving and conflict regulation between
182 individuals and groups. Political action occurs at different levels of the lineage structure, and each is demarcated as a focus or sphere of authority. But all authority stems from

*613 segment. He acts in concert with other 'awaaqil (plural of
554 'aqila) of the tertiary segments of his secondary group when
571 lineage matters call for decision-making at this level.

*613 Tertiary segments are replicate groups descended from one
571 ancestor, they operate with a common ideology pursuant of
183 common interests and goals. As we shall see, this common
675 ideology is expressed in a kind of code, or contract, which
all members of the group swear to uphold and abide by according
to the principle of blood responsibility. Tertiary codes in
[181] al-Qasr are a reflection and an affirmation of a wider system
of values and norms which bind the Bedouins of the Western
Desert together into a political system. This wider normative
[671] system is expressed in the customary legal system of the
Bedouins known as 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe").

*613 The primary duty attached to the office of 'aqila is
•578 the regulation of conflict. It is worth noting here that
571 conflict regulation is not equivalent to conflict resolution.
554 The latter process carries with it the intimation that the
causes of conflict have been treated and resolved, that conflict
has been eliminated. Nothing could be further from the truth
in a segmentary society where the various segments actually
constitute conflict groups; consequently, conflict between
groups or individuals who represent groups may be contained
but never forgotten. Conflict is an ongoing process among

*613 •578 571 554 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of social conflict and not its causes.

The 'aqila regulates conflict between the members of his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems of authority relations. The 'aqila may pre-empt the authority of the shaib in the sphere of familial authority, though, the Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-discipline principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases, such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit approval of the 'aqila, and of all the 'awaaqil of the secondary corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval of his awaaqil.

*613 682 578 [181] [681] The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge killings were carried out according to the lex talionis, it was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

*613 682 *578 *613 554 682 578 feuds or war, secondary groups, and even whole tribes, became involved. If the tertiary group is in the structural sense a blood-revenge group, the 'aqila is the corporate sole of the blood-revenge corporation: an important function of the 'aqila's office derives from this. The 'aqila is responsible for the collection and distribution of the blood-money. It is this specific authoritative function of the office which is the necessary condition for the existence of a corporate group. If there is no 'aqila to collect blood-money, then a kinship segment is not a corporation and it will merge into another group headed by an 'aqila in order to realize collective benefits.

*613 554 Bait Braik of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) had no 'aqila while I was in the field. Their 'aqila had recently died and his office had not yet been filled. The person who [666] would succeed to the office was known by all, but still his election or formal appointment did not take place. In other *613 554 578 words, the office of 'aqila will remain vacant until conflict and the need to regulate it force an election. The Bedouins were pleased about the vacant 'aqila office in Bait Braik: "Thank God that it is vacant. When it is necessary, we will meet and name an 'aqila." Any of the 'awaaqil of the lineage [682] can mediate conflict, but no 'aqila is willing to take the responsibility of collecting the blood-money from another man's bait.

*613 682 554 57 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before the whole tribe."

*613 554 682 [692] The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the fundamental manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate ones. 682 178 [626] During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative [619] [721] [829] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to *613 682 554 •578 "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the [571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political order.

000 order.

*613 554 666 The 'aqila is elected by the elders of the secondary lineage group. The election usually takes place when these men are gathered for some festive occasion, such as a wedding.

•[578] The name of the man chosen to succeed to the political office will not be made public until it is absolutely necessary, i.e., in the case of conflict within the man's bait, or more especially, in the case where blood-money is due. According to the Bedouins, the only qualification for the office of 'aqila is wisdom--

*613 554 556 the ability to arbitrate disputes. On the other hand, it is implicit that the 'aqila be a member of the "status group." Prestige commands respect and obedience, and prestige in al-Qasr usually comes with wealth. In general, the 'aqila is an elder, i.e., one with wisdom, and a member of a wealthy and influential family.

*613 554 [428] Technically, the 'aqila-ship is not inherited, but succession tends in this direction. An 'aqila must "speak the good and show men how to follow the path of the good." Not all men have the ability to do this, and, the Bedouins say, it is natural that such a great gift resides with a particular family "because the son learns from the father." All of the 'awaaqil in al-Qasr claim that they knew how to settle disputes before they became 'awaaqil. If they had not, they would not have been worthy of the office. Actually, the choice of an

[428] 'aqila is a restricted one: the office may pass, according to

*613 554 •578 692 Conflict regulation, in the formal sense, is the province of the 'aqila. All complaints should be taken before the 'aqila. In al-Qasr, every individual has certain rights, and when any of these rights are infringed upon he may demand a redress of wrongs: he demands his rights, or exercises haqq al-'Arab ("the right of the Arabs"). The haqq al-'Arab is opposed to the haqq Allah, "the right of God," which concerns crimes against religion (i.e., wine-drinking, apostasy). The dichotamy represents private claims over against the claims of a religious state which is characteristic of Islamic society. [688] In al-Qasr, crimes against religion have never occurred, and if they did they would be handled in Marsa Matruh by the local shaikh ("holy man").

*613 554 69 The litigation process is initiated when an individual appears before his 'aqila with a claim, and the statement: "I do not wish so-and-so to take any of my rights." The 'aqila first attempts to persuade each party "to return to the path of the good," to come together and to cease quarreling. This type of moral persuasion is preliminary to a full court-hearing in which both parties will appear with witnesses before their respective 'awaaqil, and other "third parties" who aid the 'awaaqil in their decision. The decision reached by the court is morally binding upon both parties. According to recent [671] [178] innovation in Bedouin customary law, the details of the litigation and the decision reached by the court are to be recorded

121 554 Here we are interested in the way in which roles and groups, and a whole structure of authority, operate over a wide area.

In the previous section, I presented the 'aqila as a specialized political role in Bedouin political organization. As Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xviii-xxi) has pointed out, in the political analysis of segmentary societies it is necessary to isolate incipient authority roles which function to make decisions concerning rightness and wrongness in disputes and which represent the community, giving voice to public sentiment. The notion of society as a functional system of authority roles and authority groups is clear in Radcliffe-Brown's treatment of politics.

121 554 571 * [613] Local groups of political significance, i.e., authority groups, are identified by the status position, or office, referred to as 'aqila. The political relations within a local tertiary group, and between it and similar groups of a lineage and tribe, must be seen as relationships between authority roles.

554 596 *613 In the domestic field of political relations, the authority of the Bedouin 'aqila shades into the familial authority sphere of the household head (shaib). The shaib, as senior agnate of his naja', is dominant over the other males of his tertiary sub-unit, but not to the extent that he can pre-empt any of their rights as members of the tertiary corporate group. A shaib, by virtue of his age, is supposed to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict. [888] [598]

600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 Theoretically, as one 'aqila said, conflict should be stopped
• 578 at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal
593 uncle, and should never reach the level of the 'aqila. Once
[604] before the 'aqila, conflict assumes new structural poses, or different orientation in authority relations. Authority here is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this level the father per se cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 The 'aqila, who is responsible for internal order and external
578 relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the
182 political structure. The authority of the 'aqila is checked and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single 'aqila must consult with the other 'awaaqil of the secondary segment concerning matters which may concern the structural nature and continuity of the group.

*613 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr
559 corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda
571 (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above)
171 of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But
[596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

*613 public obligations to temper private interests. This temper-
*613 ing process in Bedouin society is effected through the agree-
571 ment, or bonds, between the 'awaaqil of the secondary group
675 as representatives of the members of the tertiary groups. The 'aqila and the members of a tertiary group submit to structural arrangements of organization and procedure at the secondary level of interest and authority. All this is symbolized in the duplicate copies of the rawaabit and the name of the "famous" ancestor.

*613 I do not underestimate the importance of the tertiary
571 segment. I realize that internal order at this level is what prevents anarchy at the secondary level. And I do not mean to imply that integration is necessarily any greater at the tertiary level than at the secondary level--it may or it may
*613 not be the case. Conflict is more difficult to detect at the
571 tertiary level than at the secondary level due to the practical
•578 value which the Bedouins place upon stable relations between brothers and immediate relatives. But conflict does take place, and the Bedouins do attempt to regulate it at this level.

*613 The Bedouins say that blood-revenge and the feud
682 cannot possibly operate at the tertiary level. On the other hand, homicide does occur "between brothers." We have already described the case of manslaughter in 'Ailit Ma'fas and the manner in which it was dealt with: no retaliation would have

*613 been justified in this case since the killing was accidental.
682 In another case of killing which occurred between tertiary units of the same secondary group, we see what happens in the
*613 case of intentional killing. This case of murder in 'Ailit
682 Lazumi is interesting and valuable because it illustrates
571 the dynamics of authority relations within the secondary segment, and the degree to which authority relations are manageable without a resulting structural change.

*613 In 1959, a rearrangement of authority relations took
682 place within 'Ailit Lazumi: Bait A and Bait B agreed
571 that they would be collectively responsible for each
675 other, and Bait C and Bait D made a similar compact. The compacts involved the sharing of diiya and kubaara (expiation) payments. Shortly after 1959, Bait A and Bait C quarreled, and the result of the litigation was that the 'awaaqil ordered Bait A to pay a kubaara of 20 L.E. to Bait C. Bait B, as the partner of Bait A, decided to pay 10 L.E. of the kubaara and Bait A paid the other 10 L.E. But Bait D protested this sharing of the kubaara saying that Bait B is a third brother and, as such, should act as a quwaal al-kahair ("a speaker of good"); that no brother should take sides against the others. As a result of this incident, the split between the two groups (A-B and C-D) became deeper. Afterwards, one group would not contribute to the diiya involving members of the other group even if it concerned external conflict with other secondary groups. This division in 'Ailit Lazumi was finally ended in 1960 when a member of Bait A killed a member of Bait B--the killing was within the same contractual alliance. At this time, the whole lineage decided to forget its differences and, all together, paid Bait B its diiya.

*613 Ideally, conflict should not be permitted to threaten
• 578 the structural continuity of the secondary corporation, but it
[681] happens. Usually, however, safety mechanisms such as the barawwa and the right to secede are effective enough to prevent structural deterioration.

*613 structural deterioration. Secession, the right to break
571 authority relations, and adoption, the right to contract
675 new authority relations, are rights of the authority group.
681 This can be noted in the "Declaration of Barawwa" presented
508 earlier. It was stated in that document that "the reason
[597] for the coming together of these two parties is in order to ask the barawwa from each other." Further, mention was made of a "fraternity paper" which would cancel the effects of the barawwa. So, secession can be a means of regulating
[597] conflict, and it can become the basis for a re-integrative move; that is, an adopted party may decide to secede from its foster lineage and return to its original lineage, or secondary group.

*613 Secession, as distinct from segmentary fission as a
571 response to ecological demands, represents a structural
[578] change in authority relations short of distrubing the structure of the secondary group. In a process of secession, i.e., breaking with the secondary group, joining a new secondary group, and returning to the "blood-brother" group, the fundamental condition of "belonging" is the acceptance of collective responsibility. This is a most important point. The office
*613 of 'aqila, the Bedouin charters, and the raison d'etre of the
571 corporation revolves about the notion of sharing in the blood-
681 money. This can be shown by an extremely interesting document
675 belonging to 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of al-Qasr. Here the process

*613 571 681 628 286 671 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the 'awaiyid, or law of the Bedouins.

Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the *613 571 *578 function of the 'awaaqil who act as legitimate representatives in terms of the rawaabit, and as legitimate judges and decision-makers in terms of the 'awaiyid. Not all conflict in the external political system is, in terms of our structural levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political 619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is *613 571 578 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the Kmailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving primary and even tribal units.

128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e., feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the 'awaiyid because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the 'awaiyid in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
577 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
571

181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
641 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
• 578 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the
571 idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this is the case where the external system of authority relations
578 is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
571 establishment of political order is better considered an
182 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property, and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate. Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
[681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
* [613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
[682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation is immediately forthcoming.

571 Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and
672 collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately.
* 613 That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of
[578] his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

*613 of the group, of joining a new group, or of becoming a man,
682 all refer to the notion of sharing in the payment of the diiya.
681 All obligations and sanctions which carry the force of law in
182 Bedouin society also are directly related to compensation and
571 retaliation. Weber (1954:110) has stated the general case:
"The wergilt debt as set by the judge was the most ancient
debt and all forms of obligation have derived from it."
[171] Evans-Pritchard (1940:171) has stated the particular case:
" . . . Nuer law, in so far as it applies to a study of
political relations, must be treated in connexion with the
blood-feud." The blood-feud and the diiya are institutions by
which authority groups interact and political order is main-
681 tained. Blood-revenge, or the threat that it may take place
●578 and spread, is a most serious sanction in the Bedouin political
682 system. Of the twenty-two cases of conflict in al-Qasr about
which I have good details, nine of these deal with homicide
or attempted homicide, and thirteen involve quarrels over
rights to land, water, and women which could have led to
violence had not arbitration succeeded. In fact, seven of
the nine cases of personal injury began over property rights.

*613 Rules regarding the diiya in Bedouin society apply
682 at all levels of the lineage structure. This seems important
to note for it points up an unusual degree of autonomous
authority at the tertiary level. Research on segmentary
societies has often stressed the fact that compensation is

I checked the contents of this document with my own informants who agreed that it was authentic and represented the 'awaiyid as it should be practiced. Almost the whole of the 'awaiyid refers to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of killing and the payment of the diiya. The case studies which I present below reflect the 'awaiyid as it was practiced in 1935.

Blood-money is calculated relative to three things: whether or not a killing was premeditated or accidental; the sex of the victim; and whether or not the victim was a freeman or a slave. The full diiya is paid in the case of intentional killing, and three-fourths of this amount is due in the case of accidental killing. The diiya for a woman is one-half that for a man whether or not the killing is intentional. There are no slaves in al-Qasr, only their descendents who are now freemen. In the case where a pregnant woman is killed, the foetus will be examined and should it prove to be a male then the full diiyā will be due.

An important mechanism for conflict regulation in the Western Desert is the nazaala, i.e., "the act of taking refuge." If a killing is committed, the killer immediately seeks protection by going to the residence of a neutral third party. The third party, who may or may not be an 'aqila, and his lineage give protection to the whole tertiary segment of the killer. This may involve the actual relocation of the killer's bait to the residence of the protecting group for

578 682 *613 778 the period of one year. During the period of sanctuary, it is hoped that two things will happen: that the killed man's group will be placated and agree to compensation rather than retaliation as a means of conflict regulation; and, that over this period of one year the killer's family will pay the diiya.

The practice of nazaala is one means of differentiating between internal and external political relations. Killing between tertiary groups of the same secondary lineage would never be mediated by the nazaala, rather, compensation would immediately be paid and the matter settled--or at least never again mentioned. The Bedouins believe that killings at any level should be forgotten for fear that hostile feelings, or even feuding, will re-emerge. This excerpt from my field notes shows this.

> Hajj Sabr asked if I would take him in the jeep to Ras Abu Laha. As we passed Umm al-Rakham, the territory of 'Ailit Amarik (Marabtiin affiliated with 'Ali Abyad) west of al-Qasr, he told me about a feud which took place there five years ago. The quarrel began, as most do, over the rights to a piece of land: 'Ailit Amarik and a lineage of the Qinaishat tribe both laid claim to a strip of land between their territories. One man from the Qinaishat was killed, and, in revenge, the Qinaishat killed three men and wounded four from 'Ait Amarik. The government intervened to stop the killing. It became settled when the 'awaaqil met at the zawiya of Umm al-Rakham. They ate together and resumed brotherly relations. Since Hajj Sabr was one of the third parties involved in this settlement, I asked him if I might read his copy of the document on this case. He replied: "Shame, shame! If you begin to ask about this case, it may start all over again. There are still bad feelings between the two tribes."

671 They said that if a man 206
562 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
684 "write a barawwa aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
681 al-Qasr while I was there.
[114]

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the 'awaiyid,
685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the
amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
* [613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the
value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be
paid by his lineage.

671 The 'awaiyid recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
•578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
[554] larger number of elders and rajal khair will be consulted in
an advisory capacity by the 'awaaqil handling the case. The
'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece
of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own
name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the
testimony of elders and individuals of high social status.
Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr
have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the 'izba
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled
in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
•578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle their own land disputes because the government's way of handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593 level of authority by the shaib, or one acting in his place:
596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious enough to prompt intervention by the 'aqila. On the other hand, the 'aqila, as a legitimate representative of his authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict regulation falling within the sphere of external political relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal segments.

The 'aqila as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
578 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
182 group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

*613 ultimately, all-out warfare: the role of 'aqila is most
*578 critical at this level. Abou-Zeid (1966:259) has suggested
182 an explanation for the delicate balance of political relations which exists between secondary lineage groups. He thinks that

[579] > . . . in the segmentary society of the Bedouin of the Western Desert . . . honour has played, and still plays, a most vital role in the field of social control, besides providing an effective code of morality . . . A slight offence inflicted against a lineage . . . is taken as an unfavorable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, regain honour, and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups.

682 Homicide and wounding cases, which usually develop over con-
683 flicting claims to land or water rights, are most prone to
578 lead to grand-scale conflict. Thus the 'aqila will always
*613 mediate and adjudicate these cases whereas he will not necessarily intervene in those cases involving tertiary groups where appeals to moral solidarity and kinship unity may succeed in restoring relations. It is difficult to muster evidence for this contention since conflict between tertiary groups is more of a private matter than it is public, and, once settled, such conflict is not likely to be discussed, or even admitted.

*613 Most of my details on conflict regulation and the
578 judicial process in al-Qasr involve political action between
619 secondary or primary groups, eighteen of the twenty-two cases
681 in fact. Of the nine cases dealing with personal injury (eight

cases of homicide and one case of wounding) one was at the tribal level; three at the primary level; three at the secondary level; and two at the tertiary level. Of the thirteen cases dealing with property rights over land, water, or women, none took place at the tribal level; four were at the primary level; seven at the secondary level; and one at the tertiary level. One case dealing with marriage rights took place within a tertiary segment and concerned the legitimacy of a man to claim his bint 'amm. Twelve of the twenty-two cases occurred within the 'Aishabat tribe. Of the ten cases of conflict involving units from outside the 'Aishaibat, six cases were between primary units, three cases were between secondary units, and one case involved the 'Ali Ahmar with the Harabi of Libya.

In almost every case involving primary units and tribal units, the two opposing authority groups were actually secondary groups who had the backing of their primary groupings. The case in which the 'Ali Ahmar mobilized to deal with a problem in Libya probably represents an atypical case in history. It is unlikely that tribal groups of this size could mobilize in time of war or peace, and in this particular case the good international relations of Egypt and Libya were at stake.

There is another realm of sanctions which can be invoked in cases concerning homicide, wounding, theft, and

what happened; some of them are my translations of legal documents which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into those involving personal injury and those concerning property rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

Two cases of killing have been discussed previously. Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which occurred in the external political system at the various levels of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe; the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual functioning units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the 'aqila as a corporate representative is active in these cases. The third case presented below is a translation of an actual document showing how the nazaala (discussed above) functions as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

578 #613 682 Date: 1947. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat of the 'Aishaibat concerning murder. The quarrel began over the ownership of land. Members of the Dawlat assaulted a member of the Zagharat but he did not die. Then members of the Zagharat killed a member of the Dawlat in revenge for the beating. Many 'awaaqil from the [571] [692] tribe came to judge this case. They told the Dawlat and the Zagharat: "Shame on you, you are of one tribe." The decision of the 'awaaqil was made according to the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. A diiya of 400 L.E. was judged against 'Ailit Zagharat. The diiya was collected from all of the members of the Zagharat, and it was paid over the period of three years. The diiya was divided into two parts: one-half went to the sons of the killed man, and the other half went to the 'aiela.

Date: 1946. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat concerning murder. The conflict began when a member of the Dawlat argued with the Zagharat about a piece of land. One night when the man from the Dawlat and his father were on their way home some members of the Zagharat ambushed and killed the father. They did not bother the son because he was only a [571] [692] boy. The 'awaaqil settled the case, and the Zagharat paid a 400 L.E. diiya. In 1959, after all those years, the son and [683] his uncle ambushed the man from the Zagharat who had shot the father; they shot him four times. The man did not die but his leg was paralyzed and he lost the sight in one eye. The

578 Dawlat, on the decision of the 'awaaqil, paid a 200 L.E. diiya
*613 for the leg and the eye. After this, the two families resumed
682 friendly relations.
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[539] In the Name of God the Merciful,
It is the day, 28 Muharram 1382, the same as 1 July 1962. This agreement took place between the following parties: 'Ailit Abu Qarasa and 'Ailit al-Zallat. The reason for this agreement is the quarrel which happened on Wednesday, 24 Muharram, and 27 June. Out of this quarrel resulted the death of the late Juwaida Abd al-Salam. This agreement is made in the presence of the 'awaqil of the two parties and with their full approval (also present was Hajj 'Ali, an important rajal khair about whom we will have more to say). The offending group, namely 'Ailit al-Zallat, will go to live with Hajj Sabr Hamad al-Dawlat at Ras Abu Laha area, according to the way of the nazala among the Awlad 'Ali. 'Ailit al-Zallat may walk between Wadi Umm al-Shitan and Wadi al-Hawari on the west side, the sea on the north side, and the borders of the Qinaishat land on the southern side without a nazil (i.e. one from the protecting party). And if they go out from these mentioned borders, they must be accompanied by one from 'Ailit Dawlat. And if they go beyond the mentioned borders, without a nazil, no one from the protecting party has a right to stop them. And if any from the other party offends them within the mentioned borders, then 'Ailit Abu Qarasa will be subject to whatever is decided against them in accordance with the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. This agreement was made and signed in the presence of the 'awaqil of the Abu Qarasa, and the period of nazala will be one year beginning the date of today. We hope for the help of God.

Signatures or seals of eleven men.
Signature and approval of Marsa Matruh Police Office
Dated: 1 July 1962

578 Date: 1919. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Zallat ('Aishaibat,
*613 'Ali Ahmar) and 'Ailit Hafiyan (Awlad Kharuf, 'Ali Abyad) con-
682 cerning murder. The problem began over the ownership of a well. Three men from the Hafiyan were killed, and in revenge the

578 Hafiyan killed three members of the Zallat. This feud lasted
*613 over a period of 25 years. It happened one time that an
682 'aqila of 'Ailit Zallat was walking in the desert and stopped
578 for a visit at a naja', the owners of which he did not know.
574 He soon discovered that "he was in front of the Hafiyan them-
*613 selves." He tried to conceal his own identity, intending to
682 eat the meal which they offered him and then escape in the dark. But the Hafiyan soon discovered that one from the Zallat was their guest. They told him that they would send men of their tribe with him to give him safe conduct through the desert. They also said that they wished to get together and make peace. Then they made peace, and its conditions were made through the 'awaaqil. No diiya was transferred because each had killed an equal number of men. Then members of the two groups lived together for two or three days and made a feast, they slaughtered sheep and the problem was over. This problem came to an end in 1938.

578 The next case, dealing with wounding, is presented in
682 the form of two documents. It is valuable for the way in
*613 which it illustrates the judicial process and ritual sanction.
[619] Note that in the first document the case seems to concern two primary segments, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat, but the second document, the "Day of Oath," clearly indicates that the parties involved are 'Ailit Ma'fas ('Aishaibat) and 'Ailit Mahatha (Kamailat), two secondary groups.

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Date: 24 January 1946
Marsa Matruh

1st Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain of al-Kamailat

2nd Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Hamad Idris of al-'Aishaibat

Both parties, the first and the second, met before the 'awaaqil and witnesses to solve the prevailing problem between them concerning the wounding of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain who claims that this wound is from Hamad Idris. In the presence of the 'awaaqil all agreed that Hamad Idris should swear the oath and be supported by the below named. And the text of the oath which they will say, is: "By the truth (i.e. haqq, which also refers to a divine attribute) of the owner of this shrine, I swear that this bullet which hurt Harun is neither from me nor do I know who shot the bullet at the time of his injury." And a number of sixteen men must support him at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the date of Friday, the 29th of Saffar, 1946. And if any does not present himself for the oath, then the wounds which are present in Harun Abd al-Zain will be from the 'Aishaibat tribe. And if all swear this oath, the two parties will be even with each other. After this, none of them will hold anything against the other. This was issued in the presence of all of their 'awaaqil and with their satisfaction without any force or ill-will.

(On the original document is presented a list of the sixteen men from the lineage of Ma'fas of the 'Aishaibat who were chosen by the Kamailat to support Hamad Idris in the Oath.)

All of the seventeen above mentioned (including Hamad Idris) must be present at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the day Friday, 29 Saffar, in order to swear the oath, and this is what took place at the hand of witnesses, and God is the best witness.

Signatures or seals of all 'awaaqil who were present.

Day of the Oath:

It is on the day Friday, the last of the blessed month of Saffar, 1946. The 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, and with them 'Ailit al-Mahatha of al-Kamailat, came in order to swear the oath at the shrine of Shaikh Yunis al-Jaraira. And they swore this oath and the Kamailat became reconciled

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that they had received their rights in this case. And the two parties are satisfied by this according to the witnesses present.

Signatures or seals of four witnesses.

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The next case represents the only time in the memory of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably [177] [648] reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government, anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional [182] political structures function adequately in the modern situation. Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

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Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned

619 that one old man kept a large sum of money at home. One day
*613 the boy went to beg a watermelon from the old man, but really
682 he went to learn the layout of the man's house. In the night,
•578 the boy returned to the man's house and demanded his money.
[685] The man refused saying that he had no money. The boy stabbed the old man to death. The boy then went to his sister's house and washed the blood from his hands, and had the girl clean the blood from his robe. The police came to the sister's house in search of the boy, but he was hiding in a cave nearby. The police asked the sister: "Where is your brother, he has killed your mother?" The girl was horrified and told the police where they could find her brother.

*613 All of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met at the farm of
619 'Unda Ibrahim. There were forty-one 'awaaqil plus 'Unda Ibra-
571 him. They proceeded to Libya by bus, and took forty sheep
682 with them as a kubaara. In Libya, they met with officials of
578 the Libyan government and the 'awaaqil of the Harabi tribe.
682 The Harabi asked for a diiya of 3000 L.E. The blood-money
578 asked for was extra high for two reasons: a young man had
619 killed an elder; and, the murder was connected with in-
*613 tentional theft. After discussing the crime, the Harabi
[685] reduced the price to 700 L.E. They did this out of respect for the 'Ali Ahmar who had come so far, and who had paid money for the sugar and tea. All of the 'Ali Ahmar contributed to

682 the diiya: the Qinaishat paid 50 L.E., the Kamailat paid
•578 50 L.E., but the 'Aishaibat, the tribe of the killer paid
619 600 L.E. Of the 600 L.E. paid by the 'Aishaibat it was
*613 distributed as follows: 'Ailit Lazumi and "Ailit Ma'fas each paid 100 L.E. because they are rich; 'Ailit Dawlat paid only 30 L.E. because they are poor, and each pays according to their means. The 'aiela of the killer, although they are poor, had to pay 70 L.E., and the bait of the killer had to pay 300 L.E. All paid according to their means, except the killer's bait. This was a special case, it never happened before and will never happen again and this is why the killer's bait had to pay more. The killer's bait was very poor, so what they did not have they had to beg from the richer families of the tribe.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Property Rights

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*613 In general, property in al-Qasr is owned either by an individual or by a tertiary group; seldom, in these days, is property held by the secondary lineage group. If we followed
423 classic segmentary lineage theory, seeing that the tribal
*613 political structure and the 'awaiyid are still functionally
182 intact, we might suppose that land and water possession are
[671] rights in usufruct and not of ownership. The Bedouins themselves insist that the rights to land and water are rights of ownership. They state that all of the lineage-owned land, with few exceptions, was parcelled out to tertiary groups a

423 long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence
*613 shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is
182 represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.
[691]

I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of
422 property rights the rights over women. I have done this
562 because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage
*613 jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion and the 'awaiyid. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not "own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of
695 property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases, will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris
685 of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The 'awaaqil
*613 sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday,
•578 market day. And the 'awaaqil told the two parties: "This is
692 a shame ('aib), you must be friends because you are from the same tribe." The 'awaaqil knew "from past history and from truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The 'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim
[695] to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

691 that 'Ait Idris take the oath as proof that the well was
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*613 owned by them. Upon the decision of the 'awaaqil, however,
•578 'Ait 'Umran refused to allow 'Ait Idris to swear the oath
692 "because we are all one family." This means, as one 'aqila
695 actually stated at the conclusion of the case, that " 'Ait
Idris is indebted to 'Ait 'Umran."

423 The following two cases which occur in the external
675 system of political relations, one within the 'Aishaibat
*613 territory and the other dealing with land rights in the
territory between two primary authority groups, indicate the
formal aspect of Bedouin adjudication in establishing contracts.

[539] Date: 12 August 1963. A Contract of Agreement on Land Rights.
Agreement and satisfaction took place between Hussain Karim al-Dawlat of al-'Aishaibat and Khalid Idris al-Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, the first and second party. And the reason for this agreement is that each of the two parties own cultivable land at Ras Wadi Madwar. The two parties wish to make a dividing line between this linear piece of land and to declare the borders. The two parties agreed on the following: first, the beginning of the border extends from the eastern side at south Ras Raqabit al-Shumar to the western side at Hatiyid and is shown by stone markers; secondly, this line should be established from the east to the west, and this is a dividing line between the two parties and was executed by them and with their satisfaction; thirdly, whoever rejects or modifies this line will be responsible in front of law and the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali; each party is responsible for his children and relatives as to their actions regarding this line which is the subject of the agreement; fifthly, this contract of agreement which defines the borders between the two parties was issued in two copies, a copy to each party to use when it is needed.

Signatures or seals of seven men.

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Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the 'awaqil) on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi. And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the first is the wadi marker, the second to the sea and beside the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well. This is a decision between the two parties in the presence of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

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The case given below indicates, by the use of two documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit. 'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

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Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives. They are present. The cause of these two parties coming together is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by twenty-four members of his 'umraa al-dam ("blood group") to

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be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine,
[778] 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family, and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris and his family. And the water which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this. (Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each party, signed the document.)

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Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath. And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

423 (nizaa'a) belongs to Khalid Idris and his brothers. This
619 happened with the satisfaction of both tribes, and this re-
• 578 nunciation of claim is valid from today. This paper concern-
691 ing the ownership of land around the well is valid from today also. And this happened between the parties: (Signatures or stamps of both parties concerned.)

(There appeared the signatures of twenty-three of the twenty-four men who were to have sworn the oath.)

Only twenty-three oath-takers were present: 30 July 1964. I, Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, agree on the signatures of only twenty-three oath-takers. (Signature of Khalid Za'aluk.)

648 We have mentioned that the 'awaiyid prevails in al-
691 Qasr, but have also noted that where the security of the
578 desert is threatened the government is likely to intervene. The government enters tribal conflict in al-Qasr with the tacit approval of the Bedouins. As one informant remarked: "The 'awaiyid is the best way to handle problems, but the police will handle what the 'awaiyid cannot."

423 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) and
691 'Aishaibat ('Ali Ahmar) over water rights. Many members of
578 both tribes took part in this conflict. The government had
619 to intervene: they formed a peace committee made up of all
648 * [613] the 'awaaqil of both tribes and the 'umda and shaikh from
[634] each tribe.

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the wadi after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
619 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict,
648 and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins, this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and even greater problems.

674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
[682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
[829] the full diiya, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused said: "I did not take anything."

said: "I did not take anything." The 'awaaqil of both parties met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent and told the 'awaaqil that the boy should have his rights according to the 'awaiyid (i.e. he should be allowed to swear the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has consequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children, and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear the oath.

The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority relations.

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562 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

*613 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad)
578 and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man
582 from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but
792 the rest of the 'aiela did not approve of this marriage. Since the man could not go to his 'aqila, who disapproved of the marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man" decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the 'aiela. The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman,
[586] and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage but the other members of the 'aiela did not. After a period of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: 'Decide anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." The "holy
[681] man" decided to make him pay a kubaara (expiation) fee of
[684] 100 L.E. to the girl's 'aiela, and he married them again.

*613 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the
619 Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the
578 Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but
582 he was insistent upon his right to have her.

#613 he was insistent upon his right to have her. She went to
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•578 see the "holy man," al-Sanusi, who lives near al-Qasr. (Al-
582 Sanusi is a descendent of "the Great Sanusi," the founder of
793 al-Sanusiyya, who now lives in Egypt after having been exiled
from Libya.) Al-Sanusi decided to keep the girl at his farm
#613 until he could decide a course of action. One night, the
619 girl's cousin secretly came to the Sanusi farm and found her
578
582 room. The girl was sleeping. The cousin struck a match, the
793 girl awoke and was frightened. She jumped from her bed and
683 began to run, in so doing she fell down a flight of stairs
and suffered a rupture. This was a serious offense which the
cousin had committed, and al-Sanusi decided that he should call
all of the 'awaaqil of the area to inform them of this. In the
meantime, he sent the girl back to her home and the cousin
continued to bother her concerning his rights over her.
[584] The cousin went so far as to "offer the blood-sacrifice for
her," a stage in the marriage process which signifies that the
union has been consented to by both families. The girl's
father was dead, and her brothers and uncles were unable to
keep the cousin away from the girl. (It may be assumed that
they were conscious of his rights to bint 'amm.) They had
[692] even beaten him once. All of the 'awaaqil of 'Ali Ahmar and
'Ali Abyad, and the Marabtiin in the al-Qasr area came to meet
with al-Sanusi at his farm. He (al-Sanusi) said that they all

#613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
•578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
582 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
793 right to the girl should be settled. The 'awaaqil decided
683 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a kubaara of 1000 L.E. from
692 the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to accept the kubaara, and this was the correct thing to do since the kubaara, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically. The 'awaaqil took note of the cousin's rights to his bint 'amm: they said that since the girl refused to marry him it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.
#613 Furthermore, the 'awaaqil, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
[648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed him.

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
198 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 One 'aqila claimed that the rajal khair is a person
627 who shares in his own authority and presides when he is
*613 away, but he separated the "rights" of the two roles. The
[779] 'aqila is able to force two parties in conflict to read the
• [578] Fatiha, the first sura of the Quran, in order to terminate
the problem; this is beyond the rights of the rajal khair whose
influence is not directly supported by sacred sanctions. But
[784] the role of rajal khair does have its "sacred" aspects, for
all Bedouins know that "you should never harm a rajal khair
or God will punish you for this." I never heard this same
thing said about the 'aqila.

554 Historically, it was perhaps the case that the rajal
627 khair was the person of high status who represented the authority
*613 of an absent 'aqila. The role never became institutionalized
182 but functioned as a support and substitute role in a structure
dominated by that of the 'aqila. In a segmentary society
627 where the various structures exist in opposition to one
628 another, it is important that an institution, such as a third
182 non-partisan element, exists to facilitate communication
578 between parties for the purposes of conflict regulation.
Besides the rajal khair, an example of this would be the
traditional case of the wife from an outside tribe who alone
was permitted freedom of passage between the two warring
parties. Her purpose, it was assumed, was that of peace-making.

634 asymmetrical power relationship between commoners and "status
*613 group" which maintains political order. The Bedouins say of
666 the 'umda's office, as they did of the 'aqila, "if the son is
428 worthy of the office, then he should take his father's place."
[571] Such a statement is usually qualified by noting that if the son does not possess the qualifications of the office, of course, he will not succeed. This is not simply a case of power politics, there is more to it. Behind the inheritance of the 'umda and shaikh office is a logical concern and attempt to sustain a balance of political and social relations.

The "inheritance" of the 'aqila's office is explained by showing that the candidates for the office are limited to the brothers and sons of the incumbent, the former 'aqila. The offices of 'umda and shaikh, in contrast, have a recruitment pool which includes, potentially, every man at the primary tribal level, the 'Aishaibat. The rule of succession, where the modern legal roles are concerned, is a mechanism for maintaining, what is considered by most Bedouins to be, the legitimate distribution of power in al-Qasr. Once the roles
634 of 'umda and shaikh have been "captured" by a bait, for
*613 political power resides at the tertiary level of the lineage
666 structure, any attempt to change the distribution or locus
428 of power will be culturally transformed into a threat to the
●578 honor, not of the individual, but of his bait and 'aiela. And this is a basis for conflict in Bedouin society. It is

634 no coincidence, then, that the present 'umda and shaikh are
*613 the sons of the former 'umda and shaikh. This reveals not
666 only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates
428 that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these
•[578] families.

It is important to note that since the time of their
[178] inception, these roles have not changed 'aiela or even bait
in al-Qasr. When the former 'umda from 'Ailit Lazumi died,
634 his eldest son petitioned to the 'awaaqil of the 'Aishaibat
*613 that he be approved to succeed to his father's position.
666 The 'awaaqil met and made their decision. One 'aqila who
428 was present at the election said: "The office of 'umda should
571 stay in the Lazumi family since the father was 'umda. The
'awaaqil agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to
follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the
'awaaqil will find a new bait." Although the Bedouins speak
of "the 'awaaqil" electing the 'umda, it must be remembered
that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and
that the 'awaaqil are only part of this group. The names of
[629] the men who elected the present 'umda include less 'awaaqil
and more rajal khair.

114 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting
634 'umda of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national
666 parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The
election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

124 If the office left the family,
*613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
571 then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
666 'awaaqil will decide.
•578

A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would [redacted] for a clear explanation and new statement of social reality since it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the shaikh is not a potential power-
554 base by comparison with the office of 'umda. The shaikh, rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the 'umda. As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the shaikh's office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the shaikh remains in the shadow of the 'umda. He never substitutes for the 'umda, for this would infringe on the rightful power of the 'umda's family; when the 'umda is absent,

634 554 of little significance in the authority structure. Very few people of the al-Qasr area have had any contact with these officers, and very few want any contact. On the other hand, the direction of change in al-Qasr and the bureaucratic growth of the government in the Western Desert makes it likely that all Bedouins will be drawn into the total authority structure, and that the roles of 'umda and shaikh will expand. These roles will not increase in terms of traditional prestige and status, but they may gain the authority which they do not possess now. This is in view of the fact that the traditional authority structure remains relatively intact. The 'umda and the shaikh have no traditional basis of authority, so they cannot make decisions which are morally binding for Bedouins of al-Qasr at this time. It is obvious, of course, that the 'umda may refer to the Governor, and even the use of governmental force, as the basis of his legitimacy. But this has never happened. The incumbent 'umda is still a Bedouin, and this prevents him from challenging the traditional ways. Also, the Governor is concerned with restricting the 'umda's influence not increasing it.

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I do not mean to imply that there is, or will be, a struggle for power between traditional authority represented by the 'aqila and modern legal authority represented by the 'umda. Such a struggle could not actually occur since when, and if, the 'umda came to represent authority in a newly

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structured situation the traditional authority structure would have disappeared from the scene.

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But, there is a struggle for authority recognition going on in al-Qasr. It is related to the change from the old basis of traditional authority to a new basis of legal authority. At the heart of this struggle is the role of the rajal khair. The rajal khair has a firm public basis for establishing himself in an authoritative and representative role. Traditionally, the rajal khair has faced inward and outward: he has used his ascribed position on the al-Qasr prestige scale to augment his status and influence, and, at the same time, his economic rationality has oriented him toward Marsa Matruh. In the present stage of culture change, the rajal khair is in a position to combine his ascribed and achieved attributes to gain entrance to a new reference group, the Egyptian bureaucracy. This offers him a new kind of prestige as well as affording him new opportunities for power, and even authority, over his fellow Bedouins.

[648]

The rajal khair, in view of his movement between the old and new in Egypt, maintains a tertium quid status in two camps. While he has one foot in the traditional community because of his role in conflict regulation and the manipulation of traditional values, the rajal khair also has a foot in the

from the process of dispute settlement; and the semi-nomadic nature of the population in the area. 114 123

The reliance on the case-study method and especially that of Turner's "social drama" which requires extensive and detailed knowledge of the sequential development of a number of cases over a long period of time proved to be a major task in a society where disputes are settled not in formal hearings, but by means of informal mediation and behind the scene negotiations. These activities covered a large area, and were shrouded in a great deal of secrecy. The assumption is that the parties involved in the dispute should be given the privacy and chance to arrive at an acceptable settlement without being conscious of or influenced by the opinion of non-interested parties. The public hearing, or the mi'ad, loves the announcement of the agreement arrived at in private. As will be seen later, very little factual information about the dispute is discussed in the mi'ad. No record is kept of either the discussion in the mi'ad or the preceding negotiations. The process of dispute settlement is, then, highly decentralized. To be able to follow one particular dispute involves the constant reliance on informants not only to acquaint the anthropologist with the places of negotiations, but also to fill the gaps in the information about the process of negotiation itself. 114 123 124 627 578

As a woman anthropologist, I found myself at a disadvantage in a society where women were excluded from public participation. It is true that from the very beginning of the field work I was never cast into the role of the native woman, yet, my position as a woman posed a certain number of problems. When I first arrived in the area, I made a deliberate effort not to identify with the native women. When it was suggested to me that the relatively short skirts I wore were not practical for riding donkeys 114 123 562

233 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In
731 many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed
464 find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs.
434 The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the un-
182 certainty of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way
613 of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, es-
182 pecially those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One im-
682 portant gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the Amar paid in his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members.
613 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait
682 Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty
578 years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney. Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the receipt of bloodmoney.

613 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggarty, led
675 many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the
578 Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given Bait from the Amar.

613 Another factor which led to the need to formalize the rules of the
578 Amar was the increase in the kind of disputes for which there is no pro-
672 vision in the customary law of Awlad Ali. Such disputes arise mainly out
671 of situations which are relatively novel to the area. A large number of
681 these situations involve the relationship between the tribal population and the government authorities recently taking a major part in managing the affairs of the area. There were no rules in Awlad Ali law to guide decisions in cases involving financial liability of a member of the Amar in cases such as confiscation of smuggled goods, destruction of government property, or false testimony leading to the conviction of a fellow tribesman by the government authorities. The list of cases such as these is rapidly increasing. Many members of the Amar refuse to share in the payment of liabilities arising out of such cases on the basis that since no provision has been made in the customary law of Awlad Ali, then the Amar as a whole should not take corporate responsibility for such actions. They assert that corporate responsibility of the Amar is the exception rather than the rule and therefore, where there is no specific rule, the responsibility is an individual one. Others insist that it is the corporate responsibility of the Amar in such matters that maintains the Amar as a group and gives incentives to the members to retain their membership in the Amar, and therefore, should be the rule rather than the exception, covering any form of liability unless individual responsibility is specified.

613 This made it essential to specify in some kind of formal statement
672 which liabilities are to be considered collective for which the Amar has
675 to pay as a corporate unit and which are to remain as individual responsibility. This is done either by listing the cases of individual

His Bait is the wealthiest in the
613 Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
554 mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
627 position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial con-
[556] nections in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar
who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary
Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to
conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of in-
[682] stances he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who
had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had
it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary
Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided
613 into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of
[675] extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar
• [578] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in
the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare al-
613 682 though not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil
[182] stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collec-
tion of money to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. Since
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the
Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about
613 the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circum-
682 stances where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
578 yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This
000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple per-
613 sonal persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the ma-
571 jority decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up pop-
578 ular support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents. If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases is toward the separation of one or more of its constiuent Baits. Origi-
613 nally this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of blood-
682 money. If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when dis-
613 tribution is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[672] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

PHASE I

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[464] In September of 1956, Mansur from bait Eweidha of the Aggary Eila, who works as a driver in one of the government projects in the area, went to Alexandria with a friend, a member of the Gemei'at tribe. In one of the bars there, Mansur got drunk and entered into an argument with his friend. The argument turned into a fight during which he hit his friend with a broken bottle. Two days later, the friend died. A settlement was made between Mansur and the victim's family and bloodmoney was established at L. 300.

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683 Two weeks after the above incident, the same person, Mansur, was driving the government car on his regualr duty when he ran over two members of the Sanagrah tribe who were sitting on the side of the road, killing one and breaking the leg of the other. Another settlement was made with the families of the victims. The bloodmoney for the dead man was established at L. 300 and another L. 50 was set as the compensation for the broken leg of the other man.

The total sum of compensations in the two incidents was divided among the sixteen baits constituting the Aggary Amar. The share of each bait was decided in proportion to the number of adult males (sayems) in each. The share of bait Asabei' alone was established at about L. 100.

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558 As the Aqila of Bait Asabei', Shei'eb was responsible for collecting the money from members of his bait. But for the following six months he was unable to collect from any member of his bait, including Sheikh Hakim, Shei'eb's cousin and the wealthiest person in bait Asabei' and the Aggary Amar as a whole. Most of them gave the execuse that it was a bad year and they had lost most of their herds. When the money was not collected,

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
463 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
683 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
554 "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
428 which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
[079] than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
159 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
613 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
554 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
578 from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
[661] entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, es-
pecially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for
wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe
of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled
cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

439 Aggary Eila. When they arrived with the cigarettes, Hadi was not at his tent; he was in the market of the nearby town selling sheep. They left the cigarettes and left for Alexandria to arrange for their distribution. In Alexandria they met Rabbuh Hakim, the son of Hakim, who married a girl from Alexandria and lived there. He made his income from buying smuggled goods at wholesale prices and selling them at a profit. When he met the two members of the Geneishat tribe and learned from them about the shipment they left at Hadi's place, he wanted to buy it. But they refused on the grounds that Hadi had already contacted someone and that all they could do was to give the first option to that individual. Two
439 hours after the conversation between Rabbuh Hakim and the Geneishat, the
625 police officer on duty at the station of Burg el-Arab received an anonymous call from Alexandria informing him that a shipment of smuggled cigarettes worth more than three thousand pounds was hidden in Hadi's olive mill (which was not in use at that time). The call was overheard by a member of the Sanagrah tribe who works as a detective with the police. He tried to warn Hadi of the police raid but it was too late. The officer found the cigarettes in Hadi's olive mill in the exact place where the informant said they would be. The cigarettes were confiscated and Hadi was arrested and later released when the officer didn't find enough evidence to prove that he knew about the shipment or that it belonged to him.

685 The confiscation of the cigarettes enraged both Hadi and his part-
627 ners. They went to Sheikh Ta'ib, the Aqila of bait Eweidha to which Hadi
578 belonged. They told him about their conversation with Rabbu in Alexandria and said that they thought he was the one who informed the police about the shipment. Ta'ib said that Rabbu must have done this because of old

685 grudges that he had against Ta'ib when the latter dissolved the partner-
627 ship which had existed between them for more than ten years, because of
598 Rabbu's attempt to cheat Taieb in dividing the profit gained from smug-
gling goods. They asked Sheikh Ta'ib to be their mediator to Sheikh
Hakim and his son. Ta'ib went to Hakim himself and informed him of the
accusations directed against his son and asked to arrange for a "Mi'ad"
or legal hearing. Hakim agreed and told Taieb that his son accepted
Taieb as a mardi and would abide by whatever decision he made. After
that both parties to the dispute wrote specifying their agreement on Taieb
as a mardi and all signed it. (It is not customary to write the agree-
ment on the mardi but Taieb insisted on that on the grounds that he did
not trust Hakim or his son and that several times they had backed down
on their promises). The Mi'ad was held and all interested parties attend-
ed. It lasted only half an hour, most of it spect drinking tea. Nobody
presented his case or any facts related to it since both parties had
apparently discussed it earlier with Taieb. The only one to speak was
Sheikh Taieb. He stated that Hadi and his partners believed that Rabbu
had informed the police which caused them to loose merchandise worth
685 more than three thousand pounds. He also said that the accusation had
627 been denied by Hakim on behalf of his son, after having his son swear by
578 the Qoraan that he hadn't informed the police. Then in the traditional
695 phrase, Taieb said, "I therefore follow the Awlad Ali Daraieb and make
[671] the judgment to the oath. Rabbu will have to take the oath supported by
fourteen male members of his bait to be selected by the Geneishat." He
added that he had discussed the matter with both parties before announc-
ing it and that both had agreed to it.

685 no one else could take his place. They were mainly angry at Hakim's
627 attempt to cheat them and refused Hakim's offer to substitute ten men
695 for Qudura. The temper of the meeting was becoming very tense; then
613 [578] Taieb, who was working very hard to achieve a settlement between the disputants, took the Geneishat aside and tried to convince them to accept another man instead of Qudura. When he found that to be impossible, he asked them to agree to a postponement of the oath until they saw what prevented Qudura from coming as he had promised. The Geneishat agreed to the postponement because of the absence of one of the men to swear. [691] According to Awlad Ali Daraieb, if one of the individuals to take the oath fails to show up in the saint's tomb for any reason or if he comes but refuses to take the oath, the whole case for the defense fails, and the judgment is awarded automatically for the plaintiff. In this case the Geneishat were entitled to immediate compensation for their confiscated goods. Nobody knew the reason that led the Geneishat to forfeit their right to immediate compensation and to give Hakim and his son a second chance despite their intense dislike for the latters. Some attribute this to the skill of Taieb and the respect he commands among all tribes. Others believe the Geneishat movement to be a reciprocal act to bait Asabei' as a whole which long ago had one a similar favor for the Geneishat. Still others beliebe it to be a gesture of good will on the part of the Geneishat who needed to retain a good and friendly relationship with the tribal segments on their smuggling route.

No date was set at that time for the oath. The parties as well as
685 the witnesses returned to their houses. Hakim then took Shei'eb and
627 went to visit Qudura to see why he hadn't come to the oath but Qudura
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685 refused to see them. Later Hakim had Shei'eb spread the rumor that Qudura
627 had taken a bribe from the Geneishat to refuse to take the oath, and the
578 story of an old dispute between Qudura, on the one hand, and both Hakim
[521] and Shei'eb, on the other. This dispute dates back to the time when the
613 Awaqil of the Aggary Amar decided to replace Shei'eb with Hakim as the
156 Aqila of bait Asabei'. Shortly after the decision of the Aggary Awaqil
554 was publicly known, Qudura was very unhappy and refused to recognize it.
578 His reaction was not out of loyalty to Shei'eb whom he thought was a very unfit person for the position, but it stemmed rather, from a deep resentment of Hakim. According to my information, Qudura's position was met with sympathy by the majority of the people outside the Aggary Amar who share with him the belief that Hakim was a dishonest person who could not be trusted as a representative of bait Asabei'. It was at that time that the stories of Hakim's dishonest dealings were being discussed publicly, mainly by Qudura and members of his camp. At that time many believed that Qudura was the best man for the position of Aqila of bait Asabei' and that he was the only qualified member of that bait. He was the oldest able man in the bait, and although he was poor, yet he was known throughout the area for his honesty and sound decision. In fact many people in the area told me that they believe Qudura to be the only honest member of bait Asabei'. Realizing that Qudura was getting all the attention, Hakim sent his son Rabbu to Qudura with a message that Hakim acknowledged Qudura as the Aqila and that he (Hakim) had neither the time nor the interest in taking the position himself. Hakim also conveyed the view that he would support Qudura if the latter denounced Shei'eb and appointed himself in his place. Qudura agreed and a date

was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision. Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack toward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk

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[196] to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money. Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

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[574] On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

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[521] Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

613 Other tribal segments outside the Aggary amar supported the position of
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578 Qudura, and most took his position to prove their notion about his hon-
156 esty and the fact that despite his poverty, he could not be bribed. They were also pleased with Qudura's trick which demonstrated Hakim's dishonest
613 techniques. Within the Aggary amar, the general sentiment was still with
578 Hakim although his confession of cheating Qudura made it difficult to
156 support him openly. They directed their attack against Qudura who in their view violated the solidarity of the amar and even of his bait and showed it as divided and noncohesive. They were also fearful that Qudura's
[685] refusal to pay would cause the amar to pay the Geneishat the full compensation for the action of Rabbuh, a sum which, as one said, would put the amar in debt for generations to come. The strongest impact of the events affected bait Asabei'itself and left it one step from complete fission into three distinct groups. Shei'eb, finding the tide turning against Hakim, found a chance to assert his claim to the position of the Aqila, stating openly that he would never forfeit his hereditary right. On the other hand, finding the popularity of Qudura increasing rapidly, he started attacking him verbally and even threatened to beat him. He in-
[681] sisted that Qudura and his sons should be excluded from the amar and given the barawa.

613 The word "barawa" is derived from the Arabic verb "bara" which means to
681 cure one's self of an illness. It also means to sever social ties with
[192] undesirable persons. The term is used among Awlad Ali in a much restrited sense to refer to the process by which a tribal segment detaches itself from any responsibility for the actions of a particular member. It is

613 a request and examine the reasons behind it in an attempt to remedy them
681 if possible. They have to be sure first of all that by his request the
person is not avoiding the paymnet of his share in a particular case.
[695] If this is proven to be the case, then no barawa is granted unless the
person pays all his debts to the amar. This, like the amar's barawa of
the individual, has to be put in writing.

613 I left the area a month after the meeting held at Qudura's camp.
578 By the time I left, bait Asabei' was almost in a chaotic situation.
[114] Many thought that the outcome would be in favor of Qudura, who would
emerge from all the happenings as the leader of bait Asabei' as a whole.
Others thought that the only possible outcome was for bait Asabei' to be
divided into two or even three separate units with their own respective
leaders.

Analysis

114 All events of the second phase occurred while I was in the area.
627 Nonetheless I was not able to observe directly all of these events, due
to the nature of the judicial process among Awlad Ali which relies, as
has been mentioned earlier, on informal mediation and influence, rather
than on formal court hearings. Most of the above events happened behind
[124] closed doors and with a great amount of secrecy. For this reason I had
to rely partly on informants' accounts of what exactly had happened be-
tween the parties involved.

613 The dispute in its two phases revealed a major weakness in the
627 social structure of the major bait of the Aggary family. As the events
182 of the case unfolded, they shed light on some of the important principles

634 554 657 674 [743] which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authorities through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dispute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police authorities to find.

634 554 657 While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These benefits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids including fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal population with olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A successful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for [871] [474] his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

634 554 657 598 This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

634 government." But due to the nature of the representation and the spe-
554 cific relation of the government to the area, the position of the omda
657 does not pose serious demands upon the loyalty of the omda to his tribal
[578] group.

634 Because of the omda's ability to bring benefits to his tribal seg-
554 ment from the government, the ability to manipulate the administrative
657 officials is the most important basis for the nomination of a given
666 individual for the position of the omda. "The omda is one who can speak city talk and knows how to deal with the government officials." Age is not important; young people know more about city ways than old people. "A man may be a cheat, but as long as he can get our things done, he is the best man for the job...of course, we don't want to nominate someone with a bad reputation who may blacken our face in front of everybody. However, if he has a bad reputation the council would not approve his appointment...he just has to be someone who can get things done..."

159 Muftah Mughaieb, the sheikh of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the
634 district of Haman, described the circumstances of his nomination as
554 follows:
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625 Before the former sheikh of that tribal segment died (he was Muftah's uncle), one member of the group got into an argument with the police officer in charge of the police station in the district. The tribesman insulted the police officer who insisted on arresting him. Rumors also had it that the police officer was using his authority to reduce the share of the tribal segment in the government aid which was badly needed during that particular year. Sheikh Muftah, whose father is the Aqila of

159 bait Mughaieb of the Sanagrah tribe, went to the officer and apol-
634 ogized to him on behalf of the whole group and invited him to a
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657 lavish dinner party. The charges against the tribesman were soon
666 dropped, and it was concluded that it was because of the way Muftah
[578] had handled the situation. Since that incident, Muftah has been
[625] known as an expert in handling the government officials. One year later, the sheikh of the tribal segment died, and a meeting was held during which the important members of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the district decided to nominate Muftah for the position of the sheikh, vacant by the death of his uncle. Muftah, who was attending the meeting, was asked to accept the nomination, and he agreed. "...I accepted the nomination reluctantly." Muftah later told me, "I did not really want to become the sheikh. The
159 position does not bring any personal benefit, and it involves a
634 lot of responsibility. The sheikh has to act as an attorney for
554 his tribe, represent it to the government and competes with other
657 sheikhs to bring his people things that the other sheikhs cannot get for theirs, like more membership in the cooperative units or in the socialist union. And what does he get in return? Nothing... not even the gratitude of his people. To them, he is a servant of the tribe, and his duty is to look after its interest. If he doesn't, then everybody is quick to criticize him. I had to accept the nomination because I felt it was my duty to do so and not to embarrass the awaqil and the important people of the tribe who
[465] put their confidence in me. As far as the government, all I get is six pounds a month."

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Awlad Ali

CHAPTER V

MARRIAGE: A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

593 578 A survey of all disputes occurring among the eilat Aggary in the last five years shows that more than 70% were disputes over "women," the usual phrase referring to cases involving marital relations. Disagreement over matters arising out of quarrels between husband and wife or between one of the spouses and his or her in-laws often constitute the basis for these disputes. What seems to make marriage and the family particularly productive of conflict is the fact that although residence is commonly virilocal, and the majority of the women leaving their own families to live with the husband, the woman retains her membership in her father's family after the marriage, and her agnatic group keeps an active interest in her, even after she is married. Marriage then brings face to face the interests of two groups. These interests affect the relationship between the married couple; and, more importantly, the relationship between the latter affects the interests of their respective groups. This, in many instances, leads to direct conflict between the two groups.

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581 671 585 675 The position of the Awlad Ali daraieb with regard to marriage relations is based on the Islamic law with minor modifications to suit the requirements of local life. According to the Muslim law, marriage is a civil contract affected by the request of one party and the agreement of the other. No witnesses are needed for the legalization of the marriage, according to some of the Shi'a sects, although the Sunni schools of Muslim jurisprudence insist that two adult male and two adult females

Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away
593 to punish Hemeida for what he thought was disrespectful behavior. He
594 then proceeded to descirbe how Hemeida, after bringing the blanket out
606 for Muftah, went inside and spent the night with his wife, defying the
586 basic rule of not showing intimacy in the presence of older people,
627 especially the parents or parents-in-law. For, to show such intimacy
792 is a sign of disrespect. He demanded that Hemeida pay him "kabara"
888 for his injured pride. The term kabara refers to the adjective "kebir"
[681] (lit. respected or big man). Kabara is the fine paid for belittling
[558] someone by word or deed. Muftah insisted that he would not allow his
daughter to return to her husband until Hemeida had paid that kabara.
Hemeida conceded the fact that intimacy constitutes an insult; but he
insisted that his action did not constitute an act of intimacy with his
wife, but was a matter of convenience and necessity, since he had only
593 two blankets, and the only one left was that inside the tent. Muftah
594 became angry and started shouting at Hemeida, who, in turn, started
606 shouting back; it became impossible to follow what was being said.
586 The religious man interfered in the discussion, trying to stop the argu-
627 ment between Muftah and Hemeida. The others attending the mi'ad also
792 [578] interfered. The religious man and two neighbors took Muftah outside
the tent while Muftah's brother tried to calm Hemeida down. The other
members of the group also calmed Hemeida, reminding him that he was the
younger person and must be more tolerant of older people. They also re-
minded Hemeida that Muftah was his father-in-law and had the right to take
his daughter away any time he chose. They urged him to "defeat the devil"
[681] and to apologize to his father-in-law and pay him kabara. He seemed
convinced but insisted that all he was going to pay was five pounds and
a goat. Muftahh brother and one of the neighbors then left the tent and

The case persisted for more than two months with no sign that either party was willing to give into the demands of the other. I left the area before any solution to the case was achieved.

Another relevant case is one which involved a dispute between Hassan Hassanein from the Sanagrah tribe and the father-in-law of his daughter who was also from the same tribe and who lived in the same area. The case started when Hassanein was visited by a friend from the Zeheibat tribe in Matruh, an old man of 60 or 70 years. During the night that this guest spent at Hassanein's house, they got to talking about marriage and the fact that although his guest was a wealthy and respected man, he had only one wife. After a lengthy talk, it seemed that the old man was convinced that he should have a second wife and asked Hassanein if he knew of a suitable girl to marry. Hassanein suggested his daughter's sister-in-law. Hassanein took the prospective groom to the tent of his daughter's father-in-law and discussed the matter with the father of the prospective bride who agreed to marry his daughter to Hassanein's guest if he paid the sume of 200 pounds, in addition to slaughtering a number of goats and presenting him with the appropriate presents. When the man agreed to the terms, the fatha was read to signify the agreement between the two parties. Hassanein left the man to spend the night in the camp of his future in-laws. In the morning the groom told the bride's father that he must go to nearby Alexandria to bring the money for the bride price. When he came back late that afternoon, he paid the money and set a date for the wedding the next Thursday and then left for Matruh to prepare for the arrival of the new wife.

584 Two days after the groom left, the bride's father (who is at the
578 same time Hassanein's daughter's father-in-law) came to Hassanein and
606 told him that the marriage was called off and that he should send a
686 letter to the groom telling him the news. The reasons given by the
574 bride's father were that the groom showed improper manners when he
576 stayed overnight at the camp and that he followed the prospective bride to the water well to have a close look at her. He gave the money to Hassanein and asked him to return it to the man in Matruh. Hassanein was very disappointed and considered this an insult to him, since he was the mediator in that marriage, and insisted that the bride's father
584 go on with the marriage. When the latter refused, Hassanein went to his
578 daughter and ordered her to leave with him. Her husband was there and
606 could not refuse to let her go with her father, even when Hassanein
686 made it clear that her husband could not have her back unless his father
627 kept his agreement with Hassanein's guest. Elewah, the daughter's hus-
586 band, asked for a mi'ad to discuss the matter with his father-in-law. The mi'ad was held in Hassanein's house and was attended by Hassanein, his son-in-law, and two people from a different lineage, each selected by one of the disputing parties. Hassanein refused to give any reason for taking his daughter away from her husband except that he was exercising his rights. Eleway, on the other hand, insisted that Hassanein was not justified in his actions and that it was not right to punish him for something that his father did. The two representatives tried to calm both parties and to reach an agreement but were not successful. The mi'ad dissolved with Hassanein not only insisting on keeping his daughter, but also threatening to marry her to a rich man in the area. The case was not solved by the time I left the field.

684 The contractual nature of marriage is most clearly manifested in
613 the case of the wife's adultery. Since the woman belongs to her ag-
562 natic group, her behavior has direct effect on the honor of that group.
593 It is, therefore, the responsibility of her closest kin to keep an eye on her. If the woman commits adultery, it is her father or her male kin who is supposed to avenge the honor of the family by taking drastic actions, including killing, against the adulteress and/or her partner. But the marriage usually takes the woman away from the close watch of her family and puts her under the supervision of her husband who becomes entrusted with the duty of guarding her, and therefore partially responsible for her action. His responsibility is enhanced by the fact that although the wife's behavior does not affect him or his family, it has a definite effect on the honor and reputation of his children (Abou-Zeid, 1965).

684 The gravest insult that one can direct to a person in the area is
578 to describe his mother of being of disrepute. In their joking relations,
562 young men usually refer to eachother's father as being a dog or a theif
593 or a cheat, but none could refer to the mother. A woman of questionable
[522] reputation affects the reputation of her family in general and her children in particular. Any reference to the mother in the form of an accusation is supposed to be cleaned only by blood. Not only does this apply to the woman's voluntary behavior, but also to her physical and mental
[934] condition. If a woman loses her mind, the news is usually kept a secret,
684 especially by her children. The responsibility for retaliation in the
613 case of adultery, then, is divided between her nearest kinsman and her
562 husband. This gives both sides a vague and undetermined right of re-
593 venge. This division of the right of revenge explains the infrequency

159 lived. Five years ago the husband died in a mining accident leaving
562 Fatma with a ten-month-old boy. By that time, her father had been dis-
428 abled, and her brothers wanted to manage her husband's store on her be-
593 half. Knowing that her brothers were greedy, she refused and insisted
444 that she take care of the store herself. The brothers objected on the grounds that it was not customary for a decent woman to be exposed to the customers in the store. When she insisted, the brothers threatened her. When the threats did not work, they beat her. After that, she
[625] went to the police station in the area, filed a complaint against her brothers, and asked for police protection. The police officer in charge brought the brothers in and warned them that if they interfered with the store, not only would he arrest them, but he would also use his influence to get them forced from the irrigation projects where three of them worked. The threat worked, and they became friendly with their sister, buying things for the store whenever they went to Alexandria and sometimes helping in the store with her consent when she was on housecalls as a midwife. A year later Fatma was married for the second time to a
159 distant cousin; a few months later her father died. In a family meeting
562 that followed the funeral, Fatma made her announcement that she was claim-
428 ing her share of her father's herd. The brothers were angry and tried to
593 beat her. But the older members of the bait who were present at the meet-
233 ing stopped them and told them that Fatma had all the right to claim her
[587] share of the inheritance according to Awlad Ali ways and that there was nothing that they could do about it. She was characterized in that
[578] meeting as "bint haram" (illegitimate child), an insult used to refer to those who show selfishness in their kinship obligations. When she left the camp with her share of the herd, this seemed to have severed

682 "...It means that I will never lend my cooking pot to my neighbor
672 lest his child trip over it and I would be asked to pay his blood-
627 money."
695

So, the bloodmoney was divided into two sections, one to be paid by Hemeida, and the other to be the responsibility of the rope, which meant that the victim's relatives only took home half of the bloodmoney.

683 CASE #2: The Case of the Curious Neighbor

682 This is the case of 66-year-old Selouma whose barley land
• 578 bordered that of Muftah, a distant member of the same tribe. A
672 small area of rocky land separated the two areas. Throughout the time that Muftah was preparing his land for barley cultivation, Selouma used to sit on the dividing rocks, observing his neighbor work on his land and making jokes about the amount of time and effort Muftah was putting into his land, especially when it looked like a dry year, anyway, and no barley would be cultivated. For more than a week Muftah tolerated his neighbor's remarks. "I always said to myself, 'Don't follow the devil... He is an old man and doesn't know what he is saying.' But that day I could not take it any longer. My wife and children were sick, and I didn't have any money to bring them medicine or even food. I wanted to finish preparing the land because it looked like it was going to rain that day. I went to the area I was working on when Selouma started his jokes. I was mad. I took a small stone and threw it at him to scare him and make him stop. The stone hit his leg. It was a small stone, and I didn't think it would harm him. Actually, he stood on his

683
682 feet after that and left." It seems that later the wound got in-
672 fected. Six months after the incident, Selouma was taken to the
[578] hospital with an infected wound, and three days later he died from
that infection. Selouma's son, Ali, demanded that Muftah pay a
full bloodmoney (L.E. 400) for the death of his father, since the
death was directly caused by the wound inflicted by Muftah. Muftah
denied the charges and claimed that the infected wound which caused
683 the death of Selouma was not the one inflicted by the stone. Media-
682 tions continued for some time, and when no agreement was achieved,
672 the aqilas of the two baits to which the parties belonged declared
695 that the decision should be made by the oath which Muftah had to
613 take if he insisted on his claims that the wound was not caused by
his action. Since the case involved the life of a man, Muftah had
to be supported in his oath by fifty-five adult male members of
[691] his 'amar, or 'eila. In accordance with the Daraieb, the selection
[778] was done by members of Selouma's Bait who also selected the tomb of
the saint where the oath would be undertaken. On the date the oath
was to be taken, the disputing parties, as well as all the notables
of friendly tribal segments who were invited to witness the oath,
went to the tomb of the saint. As they started with the procedures,
[784] two of Muftah's cousins who were to support him in the oath and his
uncle refused to swear on the grounds that they were not sure that
Muftah was telling the truth and therefore could not subject them-
selves to the supernatural hazards of taking a false oath. Attempts
by other members who were to support Muftah were made to force the
three men to swear, since their refusal meant that the bloodmoney

311 was a large area of grazing land which also belonged to the Bait
423
613 of Yadem. The area attracted a large number of tribesmen who
233 brought their herds for grazing. One of these was Kuraiem from
311 Awlad Kharouf tribal segment. He brought his wife and child and
619
613 a herd of more than two hundred sheep and goats. Although it is not proper for one to cultivate the land belonging to another tribal segment, yet, when it comes to grazing land, no such restriction is imposed. Only the permission of the aqila of that tribal segment is required, and even that is granted so automatically that many tribesmen do not bother to ask for such permission. Kuraiem took this permission for granted and pitched his
233 tent in the grazing land of Yadem and his Bait. Yadem, however,
311 was disturbed because he thought that Kuraiem grazed his flocks in
578 an area very close to his cultivated barley, so close that he feared that the animals might eat the growing barley. When Yadem asked Kuraiem to move a little further and Kuraiem refused, they entered into an argument during which Yadem told him that if he did not move by the following day, he would break his neck. The following morning Yadem went with his brother to see if Kuraiem was still there. Both Yadem and his brother were armed with heavy sticks. As they reached Kuraiem's tent, they hit him with the sticks on
[682] the head. Kuraiem fell on the ground, and they kept hitting him until he was dead.

682 In due course, Kuraiem's family claimed L.E. 400 bloodmoney
672 for the intentional killing of Kuraiem. Yadem and his family rejec-
[627] ted the claim and insisted that the killing was unintentional. The Mi'ad was held, and the two Mardis selected by the two parties

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
578 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden behind a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describ-
571 ing the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[58] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
574 sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important
105 of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usu-
571 ally dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happening in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribesmen get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where. The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
629 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
[58] social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties in-
574 volved and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[58] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

105 629 182 681 554 so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settlement. The social cohesion is maintained.

105 571 578 627 182 The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoiding face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

105 571 627 182 The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the informality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settlement informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

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provocation, did the same in Cyrenaica, the Order had no choice but to resist.

But though it was attacks from the outside which destroyed the theocratic empire of the Sanusiya, it may be considered doubtful whether in any case such extensive territories could have been maintained under single direction. The economic and political organization of the Order was crude, even when elaborated in the days of Sayyid al-Mahdi in response to increased trading activities and to the need of maintaining peace in the petty and barbarous states that had come under its influence. Its administrative machinery was at no time adequate for effective control over such wide domains, with their poor communications and their manifold tribal, racial, and cultural divergencies. To these weaknesses must be added, after Sayyid al-Mahdi's death, personal rivalries within the Sanusi family on the lines of which cracks began to appear in the loose empire, and it is probable that even if it had not been attacked by the Powers of Europe it would have broken up into a number of principalities, or spheres of religious influence, ruled by various members of the family. It might indeed be possible to sustain the thesis that it was the Italian occupation of Libya which prevented the complete break-up of the Order by rallying the outraged sentiment of the Bedouin to its side as the symbol of their common resistance to conquest and alien rule.

The administrative organization of the Order in the time of Sayyid al-Mahdi was simple indeed. Each lodge of the Order lived on its own revenues, derived from endowments, tithes, contributions of money, goods, transport, and labour, and sent its surplus to Jaghbub and Kufra for the maintenance of the University and of the Sanusi family and for the general purposes of the Order. The Shaikh of each lodge arbitrated in disputes in the district in which it was situated and could generally wield spiritual sanctions sufficiently weighty to compel acceptance of his awards. The Shaikh of a lodge was appointed by the head of the Order and was responsible to him. There was, however, so little centralized planning that new lodges seem occasionally to have been founded by the initiative of influential families without the head of the Order hearing of the new foundation till its completion. In the more distant parts

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nation, was common hostility to outside interference, an ingredient supplied in measured quantities by the Turks and copiously by the Italians.

III

The rudiments of Islam which the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica made his teachings acceptable, delivered as they were without embellishments, to the Bedouin of the country, and the Marabout tradition which he also found there made him personally acceptable to them. His chief difficulty must have been the rivalries between tribe and tribe and between tribal section and tribal section down to the smallest sections. This difficulty was overcome by transferring the centre of the Order to desert oases, where it could not become identified with any particular tribe, and by distributing its lodges impartially throughout the tribal territories.

Of the forty-five zawiyas belonging to the tribes of Cyrenaica proper (including al-Naufiliya and excluding the Kufra lodges) probably twenty-one were founded before 1860 or during the lifetime of the Grand Sanusi, twenty-two during the lifetime of Sayyid al-Mahdi, and two when Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was Head of the Order.

A high proportion of the lodges of the Order in the time of the Grand Sanusi were along the line of oases on the 29th parallel, for to the lodges of the Cyrenaican oases on that line must be added those in the oases of the Sirtica, Zalla, Saukna, Hun, and Waddan, all founded round about 1855, and probably that in al-Fuqha also. Lodges were early planted in the oases partly on account of their importance as caravanserai and trading centres, partly because the oases-folk were more tractable than the Bedouin, and partly because the stability of these centres gave greater opportunity for corporate religious life. The Sanusiya certainly made a deeper religious impression on the peoples of the oases than on the Bedouin.

It will have been noticed also how few of the Sanusiya lodges were founded in the towns of North Africa. There are no lodges in the towns of Egypt and though the Order counts many followers in the towns of Cyrenaica and is politically dominant in them it has only one zawiya in each, Banghazi, Darna, and al-Marj; and that at Banghazi, the capital of the country, was

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have reflected tribal segmentation, mirroring lines of cleavage between tribes and between tribal sections. The Sanusiya organization was fractionized along these fissures. The distribution of lodges among the 8 *Sa'adi* tribes was Hasa, 1; 'Ailat Fayid, 1; Bara'asa, 1 (a second lodge, al-Nayyan, was little more than a grain store attached to al-Zawiya al-Baida); 'Abid, 1; 'Arafa, 1; Magharba, 2; 'Awaqir, 6; Darsa, 9; and 'Abaidat, 14. There were 17 lodges among the Aulad 'Ali tribe in Egypt and for the Aulad Suliman with their attached tribes in the Sirtica only one, Sirt, if we exclude the lodges in the Sirtican oases. This uneven distribution may be related in part to the location of trade routes, harbours, springs, concentration of summer wells, and so forth, but it was undoubtedly due chiefly to variations in tribal cohesion. The more cohesive tribes had a single lodge, or, in the case of the Magharba, 2 lodges. The very cantonized Darsa tribe, whose lack of solidarity was largely due to their very broken country and the oecological self-sufficiency of their sections, each of which was more or less stable in its own territory, had no less than 9 lodges. The ethnically heterogeneous, widely dispersed, and structurally confused 'Awaqir tribe had 6 lodges, and the 'Abaidat tribe, which showed even less unity of sentiment and action, had 9 lodges. The most broken up tribe of all, the tribe in which the sections were most intermixed, and the tribe which displayed the minimum of political cohesion, was the Aulad 'Ali of Egypt, which had 17 lodges.

[578] Among the Hasa, who possessed only the Shahhat lodge, in the territory of the Shabarqa section, though on the edge of the territory of the Qalabta section, rivalry between these two sections led to the foundation of a lodge at Marsa Susa, where the Order still claims the endowments, but a sense of tribal unity in the end prevailed and the project was abandoned. Likewise in the leading Tamia section of the Bara'asa tribe the rivalry between its two principal sub-sections, the Hadduth, in whose territory was the al-Baida lodge, and the Jilghaf, led to the Jilghaf marking out with a low wall the site of a new zawiya in the *silk* al-Hamama in the southern steppe country; but, here again, the lodge was never built. The location of al-Qatafiya and al-Naufiliya corresponded to a traditional jealousy between the Shamakh and the Ra'idat sections of the Magharba

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Order concurred. Thus we find charge of a zawiya continuing in the hands of a single family to the point at which Muhammad Yahiya bin al-Sanusi bin 'Umar al-Ashhab was appointed by Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif to succeed his father as Shaikh of Msus at the age of sixteen. Some of these families sent their roots so deep that not only did they obtain what amounted to hereditary rights to a particular lodge, but controlled several lodges. Such were the influential families of Ghumari, Kalili, Farkash, and Ashhab, and the Khattabi families.

Hence we find to-day that many of the lodges are in hereditary charge of a family of Shaikhs who consider that they have a pre-emptive claim to its directorship and to enjoyment of its revenues, a claim backed by tribal opinion and by the acquiescence of the present Head of the Order. Thus the Dardafi family may be said to own the Shahhat lodge, the Isma'ili family to own the Fayidiya lodge, the 'Ammur family to own the Qafanta lodge, and so on. So much is this the case that disputes now sometimes arise, as in 1942 at Qafanta and Mirad Mas'ud, between members of a family about which of its members should succeed to the directorship of a lodge and control of its revenues.

This development is not surprising. Poor communications and the troubled times since 1911 have encouraged local autonomy in the Sanusiya organization. The Shaikh of a lodge brought up his family in it and his sons had no other home than the lodge and no other friends than the Bedouin around it and the families of Shaikhs in nearby lodges. Tribesmen dislike change and prefer to have for the Shaikhs of their lodges members of families they know and who share their local interests. But the tendency towards hereditary succession is also related to the fundamental lineage structure of the tribes among whom the lodges are distributed, for it is noticeable that whereas hereditary succession became customary in the Bedouin, or tribal, lodges, it has been by comparison lacking in the urban lodges of Banghazi and Darna and in those oases where tribal structure has become obscured by village life. This would seem to suggest that *Ikhwan* families tend the more easily to become stabilized as lines of hereditary Shaikhs the more closely they are associated with tribal structure. It is precisely in the most powerful, numerous, and integrated tribal sections that we

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reconquer Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but they lacked the will to action. Instead, they vacillated between threats of force on the one side and appeasements and diplomatic surrenders on the other.

Considerable reinforcements were indeed sent to Tripolitania, but when there were assembled there 80,000 men ready for the reconquest of the country, the Government signed with the Arab leaders the humiliating pourparlers of Kallet al-Zaituna in the spring of 1919. The agreement was supplemented on 1 June 1919 by a constitution giving to the Arabs a parliament, Italian citizenship, exemption from taxation, &c. The Arabs were more than ever convinced of Italian impotence. In theory, an Arab republic, the *Jumhuriya al-Trabulsiya*, founded in the previous year under Turco-Germanic influence, now ruled the country through its Committee of Reform at Misurata under the leadership of Ramadan al-Shtaiwi. In fact, there was little order of any kind. Quarrels broke out between tribes and between tribal leaders, anyone powerful enough set himself up as overlord of his district, the Arabs raided the Berbers, outside the narrow coastal region held by their troops Italian officials were little more than consular agents, and when Italian forces took part in Arab disputes they did so rather as mercenaries or allies than as rulers of a colony responsible for peace and security in it. Meanwhile the Committee of Reform made preparations to achieve the complete independence of Tripolitania from Italian rule by securing agreement in principle to a Tripolitanian Amirate from an assembly of notables at Ghariyan in November 1921. The deputation which carried this resolution to Rome, though it received no official encouragement, found much support among Communists, Socialists, and troublemakers of all kinds. Its leader, Muhammad Khalid al-Qarqani, went on to attend the Muslim Revolutionary Congress in Moscow. Such a state of affairs could not last, and in the midst of it Count Giuseppe Volpi was nominated Governor of Tripolitania. He was an energetic man prepared to act on his own responsibility, and by March 1922 he had recaptured Misurata and the whole coastal region between that town and Tunisia and had commenced operations in the Sirtica.

During this period there was peace in Cyrenaica, the fruit of the Accord of 'Akrama. At first the Italians did no more than

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their rights in it, and this presented no more difficulty to the lawyers than the discovery of a formula to cover confiscation of the Sanusiya properties had done.

Ancient rights in the lands of Cyrenaica rested with the *Sa'adi* tribes and whatever tribal fragments they permitted to reside there by grace. Disputes about ownership had been settled either by war or through discussion between the groups concerned in them, sometimes with the aid of Turkish officials or Marabouts, particularly of the Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges after the Order had become established in the country. In 1858 the Ottoman Government, under pressure of Western ideas, promulgated a land code in all parts of the empire, and to put it into effect in Cyrenaica the Governor, Khalil Sami Pasha (1863–8), appointed a committee which declared the lands round Banghazi and Darna to be for the use of these towns and the rest of the country for the use of the tribes in occupation of it, except for barren hills and deserts which, like woods and roads, were regarded as the natural demesne of the State. The tribal boundaries of to-day were finally fixed by this committee, though the fixing of them was less an adjudication than a recording of existing conditions.

The new Turkish land code operated in the towns and just outside them and was not applied to tribal lands and grazing grounds, and the tribes were not asked to acquire a title to their lands by registration of them. This would have been an impossible task, and the Turks were in any case too wise to meddle with Bedouin lands, knowing that the Bedouin would not have consented to change or interference of any kind. Nevertheless the State claimed all tribal lands not bearing buildings or plantations as *miri*, public demesne, and from a legal point of view it was in virtue of this absolute and residuary ownership that it taxed the tribal occupiers and users of the land. This was a legal formalism which made no difference to anyone since the Government had neither the wish nor the power to exploit the lands and accepted that the tribes had rights of use, the *tassaruf*, in them in perpetuity. The Italian Land Registry, created in 1913 on the basis of the Turkish registers, followed Turkish practice in this matter, classing tribal lands as State demesne in which the occupiers had rights of use, and also in allowing tribal disputes to be settled by tribal custom, which

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attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the number of people who can be supported by the local resources. If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water, so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements become numerous, or when the water supply, for various reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group. Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out. Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary section will have been born. No matter which of the processes involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section, without any effect on the rest of the structure.

The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are considered to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica, and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Clients are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a genealogical and territorial organization like those of the free-born, and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further, the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

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619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stem-
613 ming from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did not appear, and even after some questioning, what information was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions, and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
173 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
619 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
621 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
613 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter; further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the man-
[128] ner in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown, and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
605 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

wife he usually chooses a young girl of about twenty years. Children of the elder wife might be adult, therefore, when the children of the junior wife are infants. Great emphasis is placed on seniority, particularly among males, but strong emphasis is also placed on the equality of siblings and their equal legal status. Between brothers of widely differing ages, there is, then, this field of potential conflict. From an early date competitive, if not hostile, relationships develop between the sons of co-wives. Competition between half-brothers results not only from their mothers being co-wives: one group might be the sons of a divorced wife. The latter situation is often much worse, for the sons born of the divorced wife are now being fostered by a woman who is not their mother. A similar condition of things is brought about when a widower with sons remarries. Yet again, when a wife grows old and her sons have reached maturity, her husband may not divorce her formally, but merely 'throw her off his back'; she will then go to live with her grown sons, while her husband, in turn, takes a new wife, usually taking up residence in another camp for a time at least. It would be too much of a digression here to discuss the inheritance disputes, and the disputes over marriage and bride-wealth, which arise out of these various circumstances. Suffice it to note that such disputes are common and affect the alignment of people within a tertiary segment.

As half-brothers grow to maturity some of them will marry their maternal cross-cousins, and in succeeding generations some of their descendants will do likewise. In this way, a tertiary segment united by the bond of agnation, will also have within it smaller groups of kin having different sets of cognatic links. This group, as a residential unit, shows a very high concentration of agnates, and the Bedouin say with pride that members of the camps are always 'one' because of this agnatic bond, and indeed, the corporate identity of this group is strikingly displayed in many circumstances. It does not take precedence in all circumstances, for, built into agnation, with the heavy burden of duties which go with it, are serious stresses and strains which in some circumstances regularly come out into the open. In yet other circumstances cognatic kinship affiliations appear to be dominant, causing friction among agnates. A man, for example, may permit

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613 his maternal kinsmen to use the land and water facilities of
578 his lineage; his agnates may give ready consent or bicker about
602 it, but when it becomes necessary to clean a well, disputes are almost certain to break out in the camp between those who argue that their maternal relatives should not be expected to assist in its cleaning and those who insist they should as an acknowledgement of the use they have made of it. In these circumstances
613 maternal links divide agnates. Conversely, if it becomes neces-
602 sary for some of the same men to use the water and ploughland of their maternal kin, their agnates are only too pleased that they are able to do so, because the pressure on their own resources is relieved. In these circumstances, the maternal link strengthens the agnatic group. When, to give another instance,
613 blood-money has to be gathered, it is the duty of all agnates to
682 contribute equally, and no member of the group, rich or poor, can contract out of this obligation without sacrificing his membership of the group. Payments of blood-money are witness of the strength of the notion of 'oneness' among agnates, in one sense, but in so far as they are compulsory, they point also to the weakness in the relationship. Maternal kin are not directly concerned in this, but they can and do make contributions. In this context two aspects of agnation appear, and the value of the
602 maternal link is emphasized. Again, maternal kinsmen are not
428 directly concerned in inheritance disputes, but they are expected
578 to intercede for their sister's sons, who often use their mother's brother's tribal brand on their own animals. During disputes of this kind, blame is thrown on to the maternal kinsmen for their interference in matters which, properly speaking, are not their
613 business. In marriage, however, events take quite a different
582 turn. The responsibility for providing a man with a wife is first that of the father, and secondly of the members of the tertiary section; the father takes the initiative, and his agnates assist, not only in the negotiations, but also in defraying the heavy costs of the wedding festivities, the various gifts that precede it, and the
604 bride-wealth which follows. The mother's brother is also a key
613 person in all these arrangements. He enters into the negotiations,
585 assists with the entertainment on the wedding day, and makes a
585 substantial contribution to the bride-wealth. On the wedding day,
[583] there is no kinsman to compare with the mother's brother; a few

were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subsequently they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support. In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradition by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrimage to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrimages. The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to move with his small group to an area in which they had not previously resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event. The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.[14] The rival and his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their separate ways.

Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had preceded the outbreaks of quarrelling.

In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of segments takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

[14] A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA[1]

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does complexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoretical presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is

[1] This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions. I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the many profitable discussions we have had on the institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.[1] What is meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen. These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections: primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so, but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty. Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order of segmentation,[2] and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections. Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Tertiary sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources, and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

[1] Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

[2] See Peters, 1959.

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682 602 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible. The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot, mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of ' the owner of the blood ', in the company of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: ' Here is my knife, my life is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion, which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 562 613 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide is said to be accidental, because a man never ' intends ' to kill a woman. Blood-money arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's ' bone ' always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into 582 591 feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

121 682 613 829 619 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality. The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people, the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument convincing. The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

121 114 613 619 829 578

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121 613 114 [619] [621] [829] [518] part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud. Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two ' opposed ' secondary segments.

121 613 571 622 114 Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of, say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action. In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

121 613 114 [621] Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another. Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, ' like ' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the owners of the ' Golden Stirrup '; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plentiful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize other tribal groups. [619] [621]

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613 Among the Bedouin, men are permitted to marry their father's brother's daughter
582 and any other cousin of similar type within the local agnatic group. This means that
121 most agnates will be related in other ways as well. Parallel-cousin marriage has the effect of diversifying the agnatic group, and creates small nuclei within it, each having its own characteristics and patterns of behaviour with others. Diversification of this kind leads to a differentiation between homicides within the tertiary group.

The Bedouin say that they always marry their parallel cousins, and do not give their daughters to others if they can help it. Census data does not support this view. Nearly as many men find wives outside their agnatic group as within it. Of importance in the present context is the direction taken by these external marriages. Perhaps
121 the most striking feature is that the number of marriages with men of a collateral
582 tertiary group is low, so low that they can be explained by special circumstances.
628 Now collateral tertiary groups whose territories are adjacent experience intense day-
613 to-day relationships. In the context of descent these are the most closely linked
[621] lineages—among older men there may be the recollection of the time when the two constituted a single community, and when they all lived together in the same summer camp. Common sentiment between them is very strong. The strips of territory they inhabit may be almost identical. Their discreteness lies almost entirely in the possession of separate natural resources, although in some cases pastures are shared. But their social boundaries are nevertheless sharply drawn, for the high incidence of parallel-cousin marriage within them, and the tendency for external links to leap-frog collateral segments, gives them a definition which could not be bettered by exogamy.
121 The basis of their discreteness lies, of course, in the competition that exists between
628 them for natural resources; however much the Bedouin protest that their real enemies
613 are the secondary or primary groups lying some thirty to fifty miles away, when they
● 578 wish to enlarge their resources there is little point in attempting to capture a well a long distance away, which cannot be defended, and might be located alongside an enemy group. They do, it is true, engage in competitive hostilities over land and water situated some distance from their homeland, but when they engage in these activities they do so on behalf of a linked group, albeit with their own interests uppermost. The capture of natural resources for use by a tertiary group can only be achieved by an enlargement of its homeland, and this is only possible by expanding into a neighbour's territory.

121 Another feature of external marriages is that they are not spread among as many
613 groups as in societies where there are exogamous clans, and where other rules of
582 marriage appear to compel the maximum amount of dispersal. Instead, the external links created through marriage are highly selective, and are thrown out into ecologically differentiated areas, giving added economic security, or, in the case of date oases, an additional item to the diet at a time of the year when it is sorely needed. Once established these external links are perpetuated through cross-cousin marriages in successive generations. If the link is considered valuable, and relationships develop satisfactorily, other marriage connexions will be woven around the first. Multiplicity gives added strength and durability, not in the mechanical sense of duplication, but of creating a more diverse kin structure, with its greater range of rights and claims, in which links can flourish. While the number of groups linked in marriage are few, the geographical spread is great. Marriage links exist with tertiary sections of colla-

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121 613 582 teral secondary sections, with collateral primary sections, and long distances away into other tribes. This spread can be interpreted as giving each tertiary group access to resources of wide ecological diversity. What is of interest in the present context is not the interpretation of the links but the effect they have on behaviour. Spread means that a group can call for help from a number of differently situated groups. 121 613 582 578 682 Each one of these links not merely modifies the structural means for settling homicide, but converts the homicide into a sociologically quite different sort of act. It can, as the Bedouin like to think, be an act of merit for a man to kill another from a feuding secondary section, but there is no merit whatsoever in it if the tertiary section of that secondary section happens to contain affines or maternal relatives; this is a sinful act. The Bedouin themselves recognize this when they add to their structural explanation the rider that they do not feud with cognatic relatives. The difference between their position and a sociological one is that they see this as a contingency not as a persistent necessity; they are able to maintain their position because they see their behaviour as explicable in terms of the simple ossified structure of their genealogical relationships. What they fail to appreciate is that these ' contingencies ' are ecologically, economically, demographically, and politically essential. They are able to maintain their position also, because the model of a lineage structure they use, along with the two riders previously mentioned (see p. 270) affords them a kind of explanation for most occurrences. The argument is attractive both to Bedouin and to anthropologists because it is comprehensive and neat in its logicality. The next stage in the argument is to show that there is a far greater range of possible consequences to a homicide than those summarized in the diagram (see p. 269) and that the additional consequences are related, not to the lineage structure, but to the linkages which have been discussed above.

121 613 682 829 I begin with a review of a homicide which involves two men of the same tertiary section. Bedouin classify all homicides within this range—as they do for any of the structural orders—as undifferentiated, but in each case, different sorts of relatives are concerned in the ensuing hostilities, and the consequences are, therefore, different also. Bedouin say that a man never kills his father or full brother. In the event of a man killing another man acknowledged to be his father, the act itself proves that he cannot possibly be his son. He is said to be illegitimate, thus making his mother an adultress and relieving the males of the agnatic line of the responsibility and the odium. If a maternal uncle of the agnatic group is killed, the offence is almost on a par with that of patricide or fratricide. When, however, the homicide is between two men who are agnatically distant, and not closely related cognatically either, but both are members of the same local agnatic group, what follows will depend largely on the size and stage of development of the group; if it is small, the homicide threatens to wreck it, but if it is large and on the verge of splitting the homicide may be the occasion for split taking place and being recognized publicly by a demand for blood money. Threatened with wreckage, a small group meets a homicide by closing its ranks for self preservation; a large group splits. The same event within the same kind of structural unit results in two quite dissimilar consequences. The reason is clear enough—the two groups are similar only in a general structural way, but sociologically they are not comparable.

121 613 682 When a homicide occurs between tertiary segments the solution, it was said earlier,

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The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down of the denial'—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial, followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force, compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not. A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competition between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y. A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace. Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively. During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

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south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly concerned in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrenaica which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide an admissible basis for analysis.[1] The complication of something that is founded in error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are introduced in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal dominance in all sets of social relationships that ' every sociological problem ', as Fortes writes of the Tallensi, ' hinges on the lineage system '.[2]

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it persists; but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition for proprietory rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition, the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

[1] Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not depart from the framework set by informants—the agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and so on is explained by informants in different languages as adequately as it is explained by social anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of *the Tiv way of looking at it*, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

[2] Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

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sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible. Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin, would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence. The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad 'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include, for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a large part of Central Cyrenaica.[1] His descendants constituted a powerful group in

[1] Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his goodwill, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

835 devoured by wild animals, the girl was "given"[6] to a close cousin who had
561 shot his sister. Both now reside with an enemy tribal section. The two acts
684 were equated. They were similar to the extent that both created a situation which defied institutional resolution. The culprits were exorcised. The girl's lover remains with his group — the odium for the male is incomparably less than for the female, since, while maternity is easy to establish, paternity is frequently shrouded in doubt — and during the months I lived with this particular group, there was never a mention of the affair. It was as if "nothing had happened."

829 If asked why these two events cause such profound distress, the answers
578 the Bedouin give are twofold: they can do nothing about them, and they
613 cause split. By split in this context they mean split in the lineage; split in the case of homicide because it may lead to a demand for blood-money which [682] is payable only between corporations, and split in the case of incest because [684] it causes chaos in relationships. Marriage, in one sense, their reasoning
581 runs, is similar, for it too causes split. Whatever may be the analytic strength
829 of the arguments that homicide and incest precipitate splitting, the argu-
613 ment that marriage does so is spurious. In what sense can marriage mean split? Bedouin men marry "so that we may beget many sons, to make a big lineage later on." The worst fate that can befall a man as a result of his son's marriage is that he, in later generations, will become the focal point in a series of branching descent lines. The alternative — that his sons remain unmarried — can only mean that his name would disappear through want of successors to carry it on, which is one of the greatest evils which can befall a man, according to Bedouin sentiment: better split than oblivion. If the key to the interpretation of the father's attitude to his son's marriage is not
581 that it causes split, it must lie elsewhere in their relationship. What mar-
585 riage does is alter the distribution of authority between father and son. In
593 order to pursue this, it is necessary first to clarify the types of authority involved, and then assess them in a post-marital situation.

The Division of Authority Between the Family and the Corporation

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851 Politically, a person's status is determined for him at birth. At this time a man has the right to accept or deny paternity. Denial is tantamount to an accusation of adultery by his wife. In practice, once a wife has given birth to a male child, whatever doubts people may harbour regarding paternity, the husband accepts the child as his. "The boy for the bed," is a saying often heard among the Bedouin; but it remains the husband's prerogative to invest
[837] the child with legitimacy, hence, political status. Only if a husband becomes aware that he is publicly considered a cuckold, or if he catches his wife and a lover *in flagrante delicto*, is he at all likely to take action. Otherwise he may

[585] [6] A marriage is illegal unless it is accompanied by an agreement to transfer wealth
[581] to the girl's father.

Cases

561 602 561 602 621 that young men spend their premarital lives in an environment of unmitigated agnatic hostility. Greater substance is given to this view when it is realised that agnates live together. The residential concentration of agnates in Cyrenaica exceeds 80 per cent. I wish to stress that this figure is based on the universe of the small camp, and the only males included as agnates are those who are consanguinely related. Over 50 such camps were used in arriving at the figure. Obviously, the figure of agnatic concentration will vary depending on the universe. If all men who claim to belong to a tribe of, say, 15,000 souls, who claim that they are agnates in a political sense are included, then the figure will not be the same as that derived from a small group where the criterion for inclusion is consanguinity, not mere political affiliation. It is necessary to make this clear to emphasise that the Cyrenaican figure is unusually high, and also because the modes of behaviour between consanguineal and political agnates differ critically. Granted the hostility [578] built into agnation, and recognising in addition the significance of the high degree of agnatic concentration, unless there are other factors present in the situation, life would be intolerably burdensome. Parallel-cousin marriage comes to the rescue.

582 **Parallel-Cousin Marriage**

Among the Bedouin the prohibited degrees of marriage are few. A man may not marry within a closer range than first paternal or maternal cousin; he cannot marry a woman of a senior generation, nor a woman known to be older. He cannot marry the daughters of a woman who has acted as wet nurse to him or to any of his brothers and sisters. Otherwise he is permitted to marry any other woman. Marriage with the first paternal cousin is pre- 582 ferred, and is more than a sentiment. A man has a right to his father's 582 brother's daughter, and before a marriage is arranged with anyone else, the 585 girl's father seeks the opinion of his brother's son. If he neglects to do this, 578 or if he flouts the opinion offered him, he runs the risk of the marriage being brought to a halt on the very wedding day. I have witnessed this. In most of the records I possess, it usually happens that the brother's son is bought off with a few sheep (about five) and some articles of clothing. Here the brother's son was seizing the occasion to extort from a farmer's brother wealth which he considered was due him from an earlier inheritance [589] dispute. Occasionally the intervention is genuinely designed to prevent a marriage; if the girl refuses to marry her father's brother's son, he can force 582 her into spinsterhood. Men exercise their right to marry their first parallel cousins. They also marry other parallel cousins. The significance of parallel-cousin marriage varies with the exact degree of the relationship. First- and, say, third-parallel cousins are sociologically different in a number of respects, and in relation to specific problems these differences may assume major [602] importance. In the present discussion the various degrees have this in common: that whatever the precise relationship, all parallel cousins are the

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

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since meat is shared by all the people of the camp, her wealth was partly dispersed among her poorer kinsfolk.

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The location of Tent B was determined by the fact that the wife (6) was the sister of (3) of Tent A. Her husband (7) had moved into the camp a few years earlier as a result of an inheritance quarrel with his elder who robbed him of his fair share. This husband (7) gained in two ways from the move. Although poor, he had a small flock of his own, too small to justify its own shepherd, but which he was permitted to include with his sister-in-law's (3) flock for shepherding. If the flock had been larger he would still have had difficulties, because, at some times of the year, save for short occasional visits to camp, the shepherd is with his sheep for several weeks, day and night. He (7) had three sons, still far too young to follow the sheep, but when they become of age to do so, his dependence on Tent A will cease, for then he can begin to gather the small flocks of other kinsmen around his own, his sons can shepherd them all and he can begin to

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enjoy the benefits to be derived from dependents. In addition, he enjoyed

621 592 571 [574]

the lavish generosity dispensed by the members of Tent A, and fed far better than would have been possible otherwise.

The location of Tent C was also determined by a link through women. The only female (8) living in this tent, a middle-aged widow, was the sister of (3) and (6) of Tents A and B respectively. Her teenage son lived with her. They possessed only a few sheep, which were put with the flock of Tent A for shepherding. The son (9) spent some of his time herding for Tent A. With the mother and her son in Tent C were two other kinsmen. One, a poor man (10), was this son's first patrilateral cousin, and they both were the only surviving sons of their respective fathers. He (10) was the main shepherd of Tent A. The third male (11), also poor and nearly blind, was a second patrilateral cousin of both, but his sister was also 11's mother. All occupants of Tent C were almost entirely supported by Tent A. Relieved of the necessity to live off their own resources, the two young men (9 and 10) were afforded the opportunity of building up their flocks for the day when they would be able to negotiate their delayed marriages.

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Tents A, B and C sheltered men who were agnatically closely linked. More important, their grandfathers, three sons in a family of 19 children, were full brothers. The latter's mother's name was used when referring to these three tents as a group. During the past few years, many changes have occurred within it, and the death of the pivotal woman (3) of Tent A might well disperse this small cluster. Further, the nuptials of her heir (5) were anticipated, and this event, itself likely to precipitate division of his father's (2) wealth, might also lead to further residential rearrangements.

621 592 604 578 [582] [428] [583]

The owner of Tent D, (12), a man in his late thirties, son of a slave mother, was at loggerheads with his father's brother, much more senior in age. The owner's father, one of a family of 24 children, had been a wealthy man and died leaving a substantial herd and a large flock, but he (12) was bereft of most of this wealth by the father's brother. His first successful strike against his uncle was the demand he made for his daughter as a wife. Earlier, when (12) had demanded his father's wealth, his father's brother, who had for years acted as his guardian, replied, "It is in your stomach," (meaning that it had been expended on his upbringing). Later, after the marriage had taken place, when the uncle demanded payment of the bride-wealth his own words were thrown back at him, but this time with the meaning that the bride-wealth had already been paid. While I was resident in this area, the two men met occasionally: each meeting was hostile, for (12) was encouraging his half-brother (13) (also the son of a slave mother) to demand a second daughter as a wife. Included in this tent is a third adult male (14), virtually a pauper, reduced to this state by the same grasping father's brother. His link with (12) was their closeness of relationship (first paternal cousin), together with the fact that all three males (12, 13 and 14) had suffered privations and were allies against the common enemy, their father's brother.

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Associated with them for the same reason, was the owner of Tent E (15).

Cases

621 592 578 [604] [428] [593] Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood. They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16), and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A. There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him, freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband, (18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent some time shepherding.

621 592 [233] [571] [613] [602]

621 571 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp, and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for lost animals.[14]

621 571 233 462

621 594 231 262 43 [556] **Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp**

It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably

[14] There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance. A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

233 685 [578] wandered over the boundary of Abd el Salam's grazing rights. The juvenile members of Abd el Salam's family came out from their tents in a body, to drive off their intruding second cousins with their camels. An altercation ensued, and the excitement grew; and eventually a pitched battle with sticks and stones began among the lads.

683 One of Abd el Kerim's sons, leaving his brother to hold on for a moment, ran back the half mile to call his father, who returned with him to the scene of the fight carrying his gun. On arrival at the camels, Abd el Salam's sons set on him in a body. Abd el Kerim pointed his gun at one of them and took aim; whereupon one of the other family from behind laid him low with a blow on the top of his head, sufficient to fell an ox.

[114] Abd el Kerim was carried back to his tent, where the writer witnessed the horrible sight of sympathetic but homicidal relatives pawing his open wound with their filthy fingers. A large hole had been knocked in the side of his head, and portions of brain were visible. After some months of surgical treatment Abd el Kerim came out of [694] hospital; and, as the blow was reported to have affected his reason, a case was brought on his behalf by some of his relatives, claiming damages from the family of Abd el Salam. However, before the case was fully completed, [682] Abd el Kerim was taken ill, was re-admitted to hospital, and died. The case therefore became one of bloodmoney, and was dealt with in the usual way.

683 682 695 672 The interesting point about the case, however, lies in the decision of the court, when the first claim for damages was brought up. A very strong line was adopted by the sheikhs, and in the opinion of the court the wounds received by Abd el Kerim were only what he might reasonably expect. They maintained that, after the way in which he had behaved, he was lucky to have got off as lightly as he did. The sheikhs protested that he ought never to have gone out from his tent, and mixed himself up in a fight between a lot of boys. If he had any authority at all, he

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[For information on internal antagonisms within the society which have led to bloodshed and death, see Categories 682 and 683.]

9: Murray E. K-3, 4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

herds have a black goat or two—such are the Shiheibat." They are families of shepherds scattered amongst the Sa'adi families, and must not be confused with the 'Esheibat section of the Awlad 'Ali.

Dumreicher (pp. 52–7) gives a lively account of a quarrel between the Jawabis and the Shiheibat.